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461 
ETHICAL BLIND SPOTS IN ADOPTION LAWYERING  
Malinda L. Seymore * 
INTRODUCTION 
When Sherrie Smith approached her lawyer, Robert Stub-
blefield, desiring to place her then-unborn child for adoption, he 
agreed to help her find adoptive parents for the child. He found 
them in his own home—he and his wife, without telling the mother 
until after she signed an irrevocable consent, adopted the child.1 If 
Stubblefield had tried to buy her house under those circumstances, 
it would have been a clear violation of the Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct (the “Model Rules”)—when it comes to business 
transactions with clients, the Model Rules recognize that a law-
yer’s legal training, together with the trusting relationship be-
tween the lawyer and potentially less powerful client, “create the 
possibility of overreaching.”2 A lawyer cannot enter into business 
transactions with a client unless the terms are fair and reasonable 
to the client and disclosed in a writing transmitting those terms in 
a manner that can be understood by the client.3 The client must 
also be advised in writing that they should seek the advice of inde-
pendent legal counsel and be given a reasonable opportunity to do 
so.4 Finally, the client must give informed consent in a writing 
signed by the client that outlines the transaction terms and the 
role of the lawyer in the transaction.5 Stubblefield took none of 
 
  *    Professor of Law, Texas A&M University School of Law. I gratefully acknowledge the 
financial and institutional support of Texas A&M, without which this Article would not have 
been possible. This Article expands on an essay to be published by Adoption Quarterly’s 
special issue on adoption ethics. As is the tradition among those who write about adoption, 
I wish to note my place in the adoption triad: I am an adoptive parent of two children via 
international adoption. 
 1. State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Stubblefield, 766 P.2d 979, 980–82 (Okla. 1988). The 
case is discussed in further detail. For further discussion, see infra notes 278–90 and ac-
companying text. 
 2. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.8 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). 
 3. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.8(a)(1) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). 
 4. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.8(a)(2) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). 
 5. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.8(a)(3) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). 
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these steps necessary to protect a client from an overreaching at-
torney in a business transaction when adopting his client’s child 
without her knowledge.6 If he had been buying his client’s business 
or house rather than adopting her child, his course of conduct 
would have clearly run afoul of the Model Rules.7  
But perhaps it is wrong to compare an adoption process to a busi-
ness transaction, though adoption is clearly a business in addition 
to a child welfare institution.8 Language of “gift” abounds in adop-
tion;9 perhaps the transaction between Sherrie and Stubblefield 
was a gift. But lawyers are also prohibited from soliciting substan-
tial gifts from clients,10 out of the same concerns for undue influ-
ence that arise in business transactions.11 Even without the special 
rules regarding gifts and business transactions, Stubblefield was 
operating in his own self-interest—his desire to adopt the child—
rather than out of undivided loyalty to his client. That, too, is a 
violation of the general conflict of interest rules regulating attor-
ney behavior.12  
How did Stubblefield miss these red flags signaling unethical 
behavior? Perhaps it is simply that the Model Rules fail to give 
sufficient guidance in specific areas.13 Perhaps the answer lies in 
 
 6. See Stubblefield, 766 P.2d at 980–81.  
 7. See, e.g., In re Lupo, 851 N.E.2d 404, 408–09, 411, 413 (Mass. 2006) (failing to pro-
vide a relative-client with reasonable terms in an understandable way and failing to advise 
the relative-client to seek independent counsel violated Rule 1.8); LK Operating, LLC v. 
Collection Grp., LLC, 279 P.3d 448, 455–58  (Wash. Ct. App. 2012) (purchasing interest in 
client’s business without appropriate disclosures violated Rule 1.8). 
 8. Malinda L. Seymore, Adopting Civil Damages: Wrongful Family Separation in 
Adoption, 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 895, 903–11 (2019) [hereinafter Seymore, Adopting Civil 
Damages] (arguing that adoption is a business and economic endeavor). 
 9. See, e.g., Nigel V. Lowe, The Changing Face of Adoption—The Gift/Donation Model 
Versus the Contract/Services Model, in PARENTAL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 141, 152–
53 (Stephen Gilmore ed., 2017); Barbara Yngvesson, Placing the “Gift Child” in Transna-
tional Adoption, 36 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 227 (2002).   
 10. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.8(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019) (“A lawyer shall 
not solicit any substantial gift from a client, . . . or prepare on behalf of a client an instru-
ment giving the lawyer or a person related to the lawyer any substantial gift . . . .”). 
 11. ELLEN J. BENNETT ET AL., ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 
158 (8th ed. 2015). 
 12. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(a)(2) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). Stubblefield 
was not ultimately sanctioned for his violation, but the court noted that in the future, attor-
neys would be so sanctioned. State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Stubblefield, 766 P.2d 979, 982–
83 (Okla. 1988). The case is discussed further. See infra notes 278–90 and accompanying 
text.  
 13. Lynn Mather & Leslie C. Levin, Why Context Matters, in LAWYERS IN PRACTICE: 
ETHICAL DECISION MAKING IN CONTEXT 3, 12 (Leslie C. Levin et al. eds., 2012). 
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the field of behavioral ethics, in “all too human modes of think-
ing.”14 Behavioral legal ethics posits that psychological factors 
blind lawyers to their own unethical conduct.15 Psychological fac-
tors may also blind lawyers to the ethical missteps of others as 
well,16 which may explain why the Stubblefield court had a great 
deal of difficulty imposing discipline on Stubblefield for adopting 
his client’s child and settled for merely proscribing such conduct in 
the future.17 
For adoption lawyers, ethical blind spots may arise because of 
their views of the righteousness of adoption work:  
It is also too easy for attorneys to become caught up in the view that 
family formation work always exemplifies goodness and morality, pos-
sibly causing them to disregard the interests of the other parent as 
the lawyer marches toward the goal of creating a new and legally rec-
ognized parent/child relationship.18 
Even without a personal desire to adopt the client’s child, the at-
torney’s view of the inherent rightness of adoption may lead to un-
conscious bias. Lawyers often view adoption as “happy law,”19 ig-
noring the fact that adoption always starts with loss.20 
This Article discusses ethical issues relevant to adoption attor-
neys, as well as the lessons from behavioral ethics that inform the 
ethical blind spots common in the practice. The Model Rules for 
attorneys address a number of areas relevant to the complexities 
 
 14. Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Jean R. Sternlight, Behavioral Legal Ethics, 45 ARIZ. ST. 
L.J. 1107, 1111 (2013). 
 15. Tigran W. Eldred, Insights from Psychology: Teaching Behavioral Legal Ethics as a 
Core Element of Professional Responsibility, 2016 MICH. ST. L. REV. 757, 762 (2016).  
 16. Id.  
 17. Stubblefield, 766 P.2d at 983. The court did sanction Stubblefield for making mis-
representations to a court in connection with the birth mother-client’s divorce. Id. 
 18. Dana E. Prescott & Gary A. Debele, Shifting Ethical and Social Conundrums and 
“Stunningly Anachronistic” Laws: What Lawyers in Adoption and Assisted Reproduction 
May Want to Consider, 30 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. L. 127, 153 (2017). 
 19. See, e.g., Adoption, LISA GHAN BLUMENSTOCK, https://www.blumenstocklaw.com/ 
services/adoption/ (“Adoptions are ‘happy law’—we love them!”) [https://perma.cc/C6VU-
XYRH]; Adoption, TIMMONS WARNES LLP, https://www.classiccitylaw.com/adoption-v-21. 
html (“For us, this area of the law is an illustration of pure ‘happy law.’”) [https://perma.cc 
/9FQF-74YX]; Deborah M. Henson, My Professional Story, THE LAW OFFICE OF DEBORAH M. 
HENSON, https://deborahmhenson.com/about-me/me-professional-story/ (referring to her 
adoption law practice as “happy law”) [https://perma.cc/9M3E-Y994]. 
 20. EVELYN BURNS ROBINSON, ADOPTION AND LOSS: THE HIDDEN GRIEF 117 (2003); Da-
vid M. Brodzinsky, Children’s Understanding of Adoption: Developmental and Clinical Im-
plications, 42 PROF. PSYCHOL.: RES. & PRAC. 200, 202–03 (2011); Elsbeth Neil, Coming to 
Terms with the Loss of a Child: The Feelings of Birth Parents and Grandparents About 
Adoption and Post-Adoption Contact, 10 ADOPTION Q. 1 (2006).  
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of adoption practice. Rules relating to competency and confidenti-
ality, conflicts of interest and dual representation, and the lawyer’s 
roles as counselor as well as advocate are particularly germane. 
Although much has been written about the dual representation is-
sue in adoption, other issues of professional responsibility in adop-
tion cases have not been as carefully explored. This Article seeks 
to remedy that. Since legal ethics can be both descriptive and nor-
mative, this Article addresses both what the ethical requirements 
of professional responsibility are and what they should be in adop-
tion practice. In doing so, this Article considers whether a more 
child-centered approach to adoption practice comports with the 
Model Rules. In addition to rules of professional conduct, there are 
other legal constraints on a lawyer’s conduct:  
[T]he rules adopted in every state to regulate the conduct of lawyers 
are just one set of guidelines for the practice of law. Discovery rules, 
malpractice claims, appellate review of lower court decisions, the in-
herent power of the courts to punish for contempt, and even the crim-
inal law provide constraints on how lawyers should operate when rep-
resenting clients.21 
In assessing ethical lawyering in adoption, this Article examines 
all of these legal sources of ethical standards, as well as discipli-
nary rulings. This Article seeks to sketch the contours of ethical 
lawyering in adoption in order to shine light on the ethical blind 
spots adoption attorneys should avoid. Finally, this Article exam-
ines solutions to ethical blind spots from behavioral ethics. 
I.  ADOPTION LAWYERS AND ETHICAL BLIND SPOTS  
Adoption is a creature of the law,22 creating the parent-child re-
lationship when biology has not done so.23 It is “conceived of as an 
area of comprehensive legal ordering,”24 with the law’s role an ex-
pansive one, making “determinations of who should adopt, how the 
 
 21. Peter J. Henning, Lawyers, Truth, and Honesty in Representing Clients, 20 NOTRE 
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 209, 214 (2006). 
 22. Alex Elson & Miriam Elson, Lawyers and Adoption: The Lawyer’s Responsibility in 
Perspective, 41 A.B.A. J. 1125, 1125 (1955) (“Adoption is a creation of the legal process.”); 
Jane S. Schacter, Constructing Families in a Democracy: Courts, Legislatures and Second-
Parent Adoption, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 933, 936 (2000). 
 23. CYNTHIA HAWKINS DEBOSE, MASTERING ADOPTION LAW AND POLICY 3 (Russell 
Weaver ed., 2015).  
 24. Amanda C. Pustilnik, Private Ordering, Legal Ordering, and the Getting of Chil-
dren: A Counterhistory of Adoption Law, 20 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 263, 263 (2002). 
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adoptions take place, and centrally of what constitutes an accepta-
ble family.”25 Lawyers are central to legal adoption, playing im-
portant roles from placement to finalization and beyond.26 A law-
yer may advise prospective adoptive parents27 about locating a 
child, advertising rules, payment of prospective birth mother ex-
penses, securing a home study, requirements for terminating the 
prospective birth parents’ rights, enforcing open adoption agree-
ments, arranging adoption subsidies from the government, and the 
like.28 A lawyer may represent a prospective birth mother in relin-
quishing parental rights or in revoking previously given consent to 
adoption or in enforcing open adoption agreements.29 A lawyer may 
advise a prospective birth father about whether he has legally rec-
ognized parental rights and what he needs to do to secure those 
rights, and the lawyer may represent him in challenging an adop-
tion.30 A lawyer may represent the interests of the child in an adop-
tion as a guardian or attorney ad litem or may represent an adult 
adoptee who seeks information about their birth family or adoption 
records.31 A lawyer may represent an adoption agency or the state 
involved in adoption placements.32 A lawyer may work in interna-
tional adoption, concerned with both foreign law and United States 
 
 25. Id. at 264.  
 26. Joan Heifetz Hollinger, The Role of the Lawyer § 1.06, in 1 ADOPTION LAW AND 
PRACTICE (Joan Heifetz Hollinger ed., 2019) [hereinafter Hollinger, § 1.06].  
 27. Until an adoption is final, those seeking to adopt are “prospective” adoptive parents, 
not adoptive parents. Until a biological mother has relinquished her parental rights, she is 
a mother or a “prospective” birth mother. The distinction is often elided out of convenience, 
though doing so can mask the actual relationships and rights between the parties to an 
adoption. Prospective adoptive parents may see themselves as fully imbued with parental 
rights and entitled to the child long before the legal status of parent has been created. Public 
sentiment in contested adoptions tends to favor the prospective adoptive parents and sees 
any disruption as the destruction of a legal family, even when that legal family has not yet 
been constructed; the language of “adoptive parents” contributes to this confusion. The ter-
minology of “birth mother” for a pregnant and considering mother-to-be presupposes that 
she will relinquish, ignoring that until she does, she is the legal mother with the right to 
parent. She has the right to change her mind about an adoption placement, and labeling her 
a birth mother before she relinquishes masks that fact. While recognizing the difficulty with 
this choice of language, in this Article, I bow to convenience and refer to the parties seeking 
to complete an adoption interchangeably as “prospective” and not-prospective adoptive par-
ents and birth parents. 
 28. See Hollinger, § 1.06, supra note 26. 
 29. Id.; see also Malinda L. Seymore, Sixteen and Pregnant: Minors’ Consent to Abortion 
& Adoption, 25 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 99, 102–03, 130–31, 154–56 (2013) [hereinafter Sey-
more, Sixteen & Pregnant]. 
 30. Hollinger, § 1.06, supra note 26; see also Malinda L. Seymore, Grasping Fatherhood 
in Abortion and Adoption, 68 HASTINGS L.J. 817, 828, 834 (2017) [hereinafter Seymore, 
Grasping Fatherhood]. 
 31. Hollinger, § 1.06, supra note 26.   
 32. Id. 
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immigration law;33 or with an Indian tribe in an adoption involving 
the Indian Child Welfare Act.34 The lawyering tasks under the 
heading “Adoption Law” are multitudinous. And, in addition to fol-
lowing the complex network of laws relating to adoption, lawyers 
are also obligated to follow the Model Rules designed to ensure eth-
ical lawyering.35 
The American Bar Association (“ABA”), which accredits law 
schools, mandates that law schools “offer a curriculum that re-
quires each student to satisfactorily complete . . . one course of at 
least two credit hours in professional responsibility that includes 
substantial instruction in Model Rules, and the values and respon-
sibilities of the legal profession and its members.”36 The ABA also 
promulgates the Model Rules, which set minimum rules regulating 
the conduct of lawyers.37 Most courses in law schools’ professional 
responsibility cirricula focus on those Model Rules.38 And in most 
states, lawyers must take and pass the Multistate Professional Re-
sponsibility Exam, which focuses on the Model Rules, in order to 
be licensed to practice.39 So when lawyers are trained and tested 
on lawyering ethics, they are instructed almost exclusively on the 
Model Rules that will prevent them from being disciplined, sanc-
tioned, or disbarred by licensing authorities. Perhaps not surpris-
ingly, “[i]ncreasingly, lawyers are equating ethical conduct with 
the minimum standards for avoiding discipline under the profes-
sional rules of professional conduct.”40  
 
 33. Id.; see also Malinda L. Seymore, Openness in International Adoption, 46 COLUM. 
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 163, 167–68, 193, 196 [hereinafter Seymore, International Adoption].  
 34. Hollinger, § 1.06, supra note 26.  
 35. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT xi–xiii (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019).  
 36. ABA STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS 303 
(2018–2019). The ABA requirement was adopted in 1974 in response to Watergate, a scan-
dal that included more than its fair share of lawyers. Mary C. Daly et al., Contextualizing 
Professional Responsibility: A New Curriculum for a New Century, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 193, 194–95 (1995). 
 37. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT xi–xii (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). Attorneys cannot 
be disciplined for violating the Model Rules, but the Model Rules have been extremely in-
fluential and have been adopted by bar authorities who can discipline lawyers for ethical 
violations. Lucian T. Pera, Grading ABA Leadership on Legal Ethics Leadership: State 
Adoption of the Revised ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 30 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 
637, 640–41, 653–54 (2005). As of 2013, forty-six jurisdictions had adopted the 2002 ABA 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Status of State Review of Professional Conduct Rules, 
A.B.A. (Sept. 20, 2013), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/prof 
essional_responsibility/ethics_2000_status_chart.pdf [https://perma.cc/J8T5-5MZN].   
 38. See Daly et al., supra note 36, at 194–96.  
 39. Id. at 195–96. 
 40. Susan Saab Fortney, Mandatory Legal Malpractice Insurance: Exposing Lawyers’ 
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The Model Rules, though mandatory, “are notoriously under- or 
unenforced by disciplinary authorities.”41 They create a one-size-
fits-all approach to lawyering ethics, one that often fails to provide 
concrete guidance to lawyers in specific areas.42 The Model Rules, 
often vague and uncertain, leave much ethical decision making to 
a lawyer’s own judgment.43 It is in that area of judgment that the 
lessons of behavioral ethics can be so important. Behavioral ethics 
tells us that unethical decisions may start with faulty information 
acquisition. “Bounded awareness” prevents decision makers from 
focusing on important information that is needed and available 
and that may allow them to make better, more ethical decisions.44 
By focusing narrowly on a limited outcome—a need to make a 
profit, for example, or complete an adoption successfully—the actor 
is led “to not ‘see’ important, accessible, and perceivable infor-
mation during the decision-making process.”45 In deciding to adopt 
his client’s child, for instance, Stubblefield may focus on the good 
of adoption and not see the potential for conflict of interest and 
overreaching. Outcome bias allows decision makers to mask uneth-
ical conduct when an outcome is perceived as favorable, seeing only 
unethical or blameworthy behavior when it leads to a bad out-
come.46 If the adoption is perceived as good, then whatever behav-
ior produced it must also be good. Immediacy of outcome also in-
fluences decision making; future interests lose out to immediate 
self-interest.47 Stubblefield may not consider the future effects on 
his adopted child of his unethical conduct in completing the adop-
tion. Further information-gathering may be caused by commit-
 
Blind Spots, 9 SAINT MARY’S  J. ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 190, 235 (2019); see also 
Victoria J. Haneman, The Ethical Exploitation of the Unrepresented Consumer, 73 MO. L. 
REV. 707, 726 (2008) (“The dismal truth is that most practitioners do not contemplate ethics 
beyond reading a statute or code to determine if there is a violation.”). 
 41. Mather & Levin, supra note 13, at 12. For statistics on the low level of discipline for 
attorneys, see Debra Moss Curtis, Attorney Discipline Nationwide: A Comparative Analysis 
of Process and Statistics, 35 J. LEGAL PROF. 209 (2011). 
 42. Mather & Levin, supra note 13, at 12.  
 43. Id.; Robbennolt & Sternlight, supra note 14, at 1125.  
 44. Max H. Bazerman & Ovul Sezer, Bounded Awareness: Implications for Ethical De-
cision Making, 136 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 95, 97 (2016). 
 45. Id. The authors use as an example experiments where participants are asked to 
count the number of passing balls on a video and miss the person in a gorilla costume: “By 
focusing on a particular task, they missed obvious information in their visual world.” Id.  
 46. Ovul Sezer et al., Ethical Blind Spots: Explaining Unintentional Unethical Behav-
ior, 6 CURRENT OPINION PSYCHOL. 77, 78 (2015). 
 47. See id. 
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ment bias; once a lawyer has committed to the position of her cli-
ent, she may discount information inconsistent with the client’s ob-
jectives.48 
“Bounded ethicality,” or ethical blind spots, are “the psychologi-
cal processes that lead people to engage in ethically questionable 
behaviors that are inconsistent with their own preferred ethics.”49 
Thus, Stubblefield may recognize that an attorney should not rep-
resent a client when he cannot give undivided loyalty to her exclu-
sive interests, but he may believe that he is able to put aside his 
self-interest in favor of his client’s interest.50 Ethical blind spots 
explain why people are unintentionally unethical.51 We often think 
of unethical behavior as intentional—lying, cheating, etc.—but in 
fact, “a large body of research has shown that unethical behavior 
often stems from actions that actors do not recognize as unethi-
cal.”52 Implicit biases, largely unrecognized, can cause someone to 
act against their explicit ethical values.53 Favoring one’s own group 
over disfavored out-groups is a common form of implicit bias, as is 
favoring one’s self-interest over that of others.54 An adoption attor-
ney may believe, for example, that unwed teen mothers cannot be 
adequate parents and may ignore his client’s expressions of a de-
sire to parent when representing a prospective birth parent. After 
all, his implicit bias tells him that adoption placement is the only 
 
 48. Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Counseling, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1317, 1326 (2006). 
 49. Bazerman & Sezer, supra note 44, at 99; see Sezer et al., supra note 46, at 77. Social 
scientists define “ethical blind spots” as “situations in which people pay little (or no) atten-
tion to ethical considerations when doing so is against their self-interest.” Andrea Pittarello 
et al., Visual Saliency Influences Ethical Blind Spots and (Dis)honesty, PSYCHONOMIC BULL. 
& REV. 1, 1  (2019) [hereinafter Pittarello et al., Visual Saliency].  
 50. See Bazerman & Sezer, supra note 44, at 99. The article uses the example of Justice 
Antonin Scalia’s failure to recuse in a case involving his hunting buddy, Vice President Dick 
Cheney. The authors conclude that Justice Scalia “was unaware of the strong evidence that 
conflicts of interest have a strong psychological basis.” Id.; see, e.g., Pittarello et al., Visual 
Saliency, supra note 49, at 1.  
 51. Sezer et al., supra note 46, at 77. 
 52. Id.; see also MAX. H. BAZERMAN & ANN E. TENBRUNSEL, BLIND SPOTS: WHY WE FAIL 
TO DO WHAT’S RIGHT AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 21 (2011); Eldred, supra note 15, at 759 
(“Unethical conduct is frequently the product of psychological factors that occur largely out-
side of the conscious awareness of the decision-maker.”); Leslie C. Levin, Bad Apples, Bad 
Lawyers or Bad Decisionmaking: Lessons from Psychology and from Lawyers in the Dock, 
22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1549, 1561 (2009) (reviewing RICHARD ABEL, LAWYERS IN THE 
DOCK: LEARNING FROM ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS (2008)) (“Psychologists 
now believe that conscious deliberation plays a relatively minor role in shaping behavior 
and that much of what we might call ethical decision making is non-conscious.”). 
 53. Sezer et al., supra note 46, at 77.  
 54. Id. 
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rational response to her situation, and he may disregard the spe-
cifics of her situation or more recent empirical evidence that paints 
a more nuanced view of teen mothers.55 
But an attorney’s biases will remain implicit, invisible even to 
himself. A decision maker who acts against his own ethical val-
ues—say, by ignoring the wishes of the client because he knows 
better what is in her interest—will “maintain an ‘illusion of objec-
tivity,’”56 tending to assess himself as “objective, fair, and unbi-
ased,” and thus capable of making the correct ethical choices when 
confronted with them.57 Thus, in exercising ethical judgement, 
lawyers tend to be overconfident in their abilities to make ethically 
correct choices: 
[A]ttorneys tend to believe that their own ethics and their firm’s ethi-
cal standards are more stringent than those of other attorneys and 
other firms. These views of the self can lead to an ethical blind spot 
that impedes our ability to perceive and thoughtfully consider the eth-
ical tensions we inevitably face.58 
Believing in their own high ethical standards, people seek to avoid 
straying so far over the line as to “require them to negatively up-
date their self-perception that they are honest.”59 Indeed, people 
are likely to remember only the facts that paint them as ethical 
actors and suppress facts that call that status into question.60 “And 
if we are overconfident—in our own ethical judgment, or in our 
ability to fix or otherwise manage ethical problems—then we are 
unlikely to stop and think carefully about a decision or to revisit 
that decision later.”61 Maintaining a moral self-image can motivate 
a decision maker to engage in “motivated forgetting,” actually 
changing the rules they believe in after engaging in wrongdoing.62 
 
 55. See Seymore, International Adoption, supra note 33, at 175.  
 56. Sezer et al., supra note 46, at 77 (quoting Dolly Chugh et al., Bounded Ethicality as 
a Psychological Barrier to Recognizing Conflicts of Interest, in CONFLICTS OF INTEREST:  
CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS IN BUSINESS, LAW, MEDICINE, AND PUBLIC POLICY 74, 82 (Don 
A. Moore et al. eds., 2005)).  
 57. Robbennolt & Sternlight, supra note 14, at 1117.  
 58. Id. at 1116–17. 
 59. Andrea Pittarello et al., Justifications Shape Ethical Blind Spots, 26 PSYCH. SCI. 
794, 795 (2015) [hereinafter Pittarello et al., Justifications]. 
 60. Levin, supra note 52, at 1562. 
 61. Robbennolt & Sternlight, supra note 14, at 1117. 
 62. Sezer et al., supra note 46, at 78.  
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In that way, they can “close the gap between their unethical be-
havior and their moral self-image.”63  
A lawyer who carefully and appropriately follows every mandate 
of the Model Rules, with its focus on representing exclusively the 
interests of one’s client, may still find himself in conflict with what 
we might think of as the moral imperatives of an ethical society. 
Dr. Richard Wasserstrom describes the lawyer’s role as follows: 
Once a lawyer represents a client, the lawyer has a duty to make his 
or her expertise fully available in the realization of the end sought by 
the client, irrespective, for the most part, of the moral worth to which 
the end will be put or the character of the client who seeks to utilize 
it. Provided that the end sought is not illegal, the lawyer is, in essence, 
an amoral technician whose peculiar skills and knowledge in respect 
to the law are available to those with whom the relationship of client 
is established.64 
Leading scholar Carrie Menkel-Meadow also decries the tendency 
of rules of legal ethics to assume all law operates in focus on the 
sole interests of clients:  
[T]he macro and philosophical ethical issues of when lawyers should 
not be adversarial, but should focus instead on more positive and cre-
ative forms of legal problem-solving, continue to be ignored in a sys-
tem of law practice that assumes that adversarialism, winning legal 
cases, and maximizing client gain are the major goals of legal practice 
and legal dispute resolution.65 
Adoption lawyers should struggle, even more than most lawyers, 
in the role-differentiated world described by Wasserstrom and de-
cried by Menkel-Meadow. The touchstone for modern adoption has 
long been the best interest of the child,66 but lawyers do not repre-
sent the child in adoption, instead representing the prospective 
 
 63. Id. 
 64. Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM. RTS. 1, 
5–6 (1975). 
 65. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Evolving Complexity of Dispute Resolution Ethics, 30 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 389, 392 (2017). 
 66. E. WAYNE CARP, FAMILY MATTERS: SECRECY AND DISCLOSURE IN THE HISTORY OF 
ADOPTION 11–12 (1998). The 1851 Massachusetts adoption statute is “commonly considered 
the first modern adoption law,” and it first imposed the “best interests of the child” standard 
to adoptions. Id.; see also Jamil S. Zainaldin, The Emergence of a Modern American Family 
Law: Child Custody, Adoption, and the Courts, 1796–1851, 73 NW. U. L. REV. 1038, 1042–
43 (1979). The best interest of the child standard remains consistent in the adoption statutes 
of all fifty states. Joan Heifetz Hollinger, Introduction § 1.01, in 1 ADOPTION LAW AND 
PRACTICE (Joan Heifetz Hollinger ed., 2019) [hereinafter Hollinger, § 1.01]; see also 
UNIFORM ADOPTION ACT § 3-703(a) cmt. (1994) (“A judicial determination that a proposed 
adoption will be in the best interest of the minor adoptee is an essential—and ultimately 
the most important—prerequisite to the granting of the adoption.”). 
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adoptive parents or birth parents (or sometimes both).67 Lawyers 
are obligated under this traditional client-centered approach to 
lawyering ethics to represent only the interests of their client and 
to ignore the interests of the child.  
A starting point for ethical lawyering in adoption is the Model 
Rules. What do the Model Rules tell adoption attorneys about their 
ethical behavior? 
II.  RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT APPLICABLE TO ADOPTIONS 
Adoption lawyers, like all lawyers, are required to follow all the 
Model Rules mandated in the state in which they practice. Like all 
lawyers, they must serve clients competently and diligently, avoid 
conflicts of interest, communicate adequately with clients, be can-
did toward courts and (some) others, avoid deceptive advertising, 
charge reasonable fees, report the professional misconduct of other 
lawyers, and maintain the integrity of the legal profession. But 
some of these issues are more prominent in adoption practice than 
others. This Part examines the Model Rules in the context of adop-
tion-related cases to illustrate the common ethical blind spots of 
adoption practice. 
A.  Competence 
A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Com-
petent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thorough-
ness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.68 
Adoption law can be extremely complex, involving both state and 
federal law (and potentially the laws of multiple states) and the 
rights and interests of multiple parties. This can be especially true 
where birth father rights are involved:  
 
 67. In a leading treatise on adoption law and practice, in a section describing the role 
of attorneys in adoptions, the treatise lists fourteen different roles that lawyers could play 
in adoptions, such as representing prospective adoptive parents, Indian tribes in ICWA 
cases, and birth parents, but only one of the roles references adoptees in adoption place-
ment—–counseling an adolescent child on whether to consent to a proposed adoption by a 
stepparent or other known person and serving as a guardian ad litem for a younger adoptee. 
Hollinger, § 1.06, supra note 26; see also Elizabeth Samuels, Legal Representation of Birth 
Parents and Adoptive Parents, 9 ADOPTION Q. 73, 74 (2006) (noting that at least two states 
permit dual representation of the adoptive parents and the birth parents).  
 68. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). 
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A father is not a legal parent unless he takes affirmative steps to grasp 
fatherhood. Being married to the mother at the time of conception or 
at the time of birth is one of those affirmative steps. If he is not mar-
ried to the mother, he must do far more before he will be legally rec-
ognized as a father.69 
What that “far more” is, to be legally recognized as a father, is 
often a contested issue in adoption.70 Courts will consider whether 
the birth father supported the mother emotionally and financially 
during the pregnancy; whether he made plans for a baby, such as 
buying a crib or car seat; whether he offered marriage; whether he 
made arrangements to place the baby on his insurance; whether 
he expressed excitement at becoming a father; and whether he was 
listed on the birth certificate.71 Given the fact-specific nature of a 
court’s inquiry, an inexperienced lawyer may not appropriately ad-
vise a birth father on how to assert his parental rights or provide 
sufficient guidance to prospective adoptive parents of the riskiness 
of a placement where a birth father is refusing to consent. A lawyer 
may also face civil liability for tortious interference with parental 
rights if she takes actions that cut off a birth father’s opportunity 
to parent.72 
 
 69. Seymore, Grasping Fatherhood, supra note 30, at 819; see, e.g., Adoptive Couple v. 
Baby Girl, 570 U.S. 637, 641 (2013); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261 (1983); Caban v. 
Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 385–89 (1979); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 256 (1978); 
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972). 
 70. See Elizabeth Brandt, Cautionary Tales of Adoption: Addressing the Litigation Cri-
sis at the Moment of Adoption, 4 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 187, 192 (2005) (“Cases 
involving litigation of adoption by unwed fathers are increasingly becoming a staple of adop-
tion practice.”). 
 71. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Baby E.A.W., 658 So. 2d 961, 967 (Fla. 1995) (ruling that 
failure to provide emotional and financial support during pregnancy provides grounds to 
block father’s objections to adoption placement); In re Adoption of Baby James Doe, 572 So. 
2d 986, 987, 989 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that father expressed sufficient care and 
concern to be granted a say in the adoption, based upon evidence of “(1) an apartment lease 
signed by him and the natural mother, for the apartment in which they resided together 
during the natural mother’s pregnancy; (2) receipts for baby furniture, bedding, clothing, 
and gifts which he had purchased for the baby; and (3) an identification band worn by the 
mother using the [putative father’s name] while she was in the hospital for the birth of the 
child”); In re Adoption of B.G.S., 556 So. 2d 545, 550–51 (La. 1990) (noting that father acted 
sufficiently to acquire rights by holding himself out as father and seeking to place his name 
on the child’s birth certificate); In re Baby Girl S., 535 N.Y.S.2d 676, 681–83 (Sur. Ct. 1988) 
(ruling that father was entitled to block adoption based on the facts that he offered marriage 
upon learning of pregnancy, sought custody of the child, offered to pay pregnancy-related 
expenses, sought in court to establish paternity), aff’d sub nom. In re Raquel Marie X., 559 
N.E.2d 418, 428–29 (N.Y. 1990). 
 72. See, e.g., Wyatt v. McDermott, 725 S.E.2d 555, 556–58, 564 (Va. 2012) (accepting 
tortious interference with parental rights as a viable cause of action, including lawyer’s ad-
vice to birth mother to cut off birth father); Kessel v. Leavitt, 511 S.E.2d 720, 734–35, 765 
(W. Va. 1998) (recognizing tortious interference with parental rights as a viable cause of 
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 A father may protect his rights in some states by filing in the 
putative father registry. 
Putative father registries, which exist in some thirty-five states, allow 
men to file forms asserting a parental interest in a child. In those 
states, an adoption cannot be completed unless there is a certification 
that the putative father registry has been searched and that no match 
can be made. If there is a match, then the putative father is entitled 
to notice of the adoption proceeding.”73  
Putative father registry statutory schemes can be very complex, 
with short deadlines74 and hyper-technical requirements.75 One 
difficult issue with the putative father’s registry is where to file. 
When a birth father does not know when or where the child is born, 
or when or where the adoption proceeding is filed, he may fail to 
file timely or file in the wrong jurisdiction and may not receive no-
tice of the adoption. “[S]ince there is no national putative father 
registry, confusion can exist as to where to file when the birth 
mother leaves the state where the birth father might be expected 
to file.”76  
In a recent case, In re Krigel, where a long-time adoption lawyer 
was sanctioned for violations of legal ethics rules, the birth father 
resided in Kansas, the nonprofit adoption agency was incorporated 
in Kansas, and the birth father’s initial attorney was located in 
Kansas.77 Kansas does not have a putative father’s registry.78 The 
adoption proceeding, however, was in Missouri, which has a puta-
tive father’s registry.79 Although Krigel represented the birth 
mother and was ultimately sanctioned for his ethical missteps in 
the case, Krigel was not the only lawyer involved in the adoption 
 
action, involving actions by lawyer as well as birth mother). 
 73. Seymore, Grasping Fatherhood, supra note 30, at 854–55 (footnotes omitted). 
 74. Putative father statutes may give fathers as little as five days to file. See NEB. REV. 
STAT. § 43-104.02. Though a thirty-day deadline is more typical. Rebeca Aizpuru, Protecting 
the Unwed Father’s Opportunity To Parent: A Survey of Paternity Registry Statutes, 18 REV. 
LITIG. 703, 715–16 (1999). The Missouri statute applicable in this case gives a fifteen-day 
window in which to file. MO. REV. STAT. § 453.030.  
 75. Seymore, Grasping Fatherhood, supra note 30, at 855–56 (discussing strict time 
limits on filing and difficulties in determining where to file); Dale Joseph Gilsinger, Anno-
tation, Requirements and Effects of Putative Father Registries, 28 A.L.R. 6th 349, 363 (2007) 
(discussing complexity in whether registries are applicable where father has already filed 
paternity action). 
 76. Seymore, Grasping Fatherhood, supra note 30, at 855.  
 77. 480 S.W.3d 294, 296–98, 306 (Mo. 2016) (en banc). 
 78. Brief for Informant at 32, In re Krigel, 480 S.W.3d 294 (No. SC95098). 
 79. MO. REV. STAT. § 192.016; In re Krigel, 480 S.W.3d at 298. 
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matter. 80 The birth father’s first lawyer was inexperienced in adop-
tion cases, specializing instead in business and real estate mat-
ters.81 His lack of knowledge caused him to rely on Krigel’s exper-
tise, to the detriment of the birth father. The birth father’s first 
attorney did not appear to consider that the birth father needed to 
file in a putative father registry. In fact, one well-recognized prob-
lem with registries is that so few people know of their existence.82 
An expert witness in the In re Krigel case, Professor Mary M. Beck, 
testified that very few persons ever register for the putative father 
registry in Missouri; in the fifteen years since the registry was cre-
ated, only a little over fifty men had registered.83 It is not just birth 
fathers who are ignorant about the putative father registry; attor-
neys are often unaware of its existence if they do not practice in 
the adoption law area. I frequently receive calls from lawyers rep-
resenting birth fathers, and the first question I ask is, “Have you 
filed in the putative father registry?” The most common response I 
get from lawyers is, “What’s the putative father registry?” 
The birth father’s lawyer in In re Krigel was apparently not sub-
ject to discipline for his handling of the case, but he might well 
have been considered incompetent in failing to recognize that he 
was unprepared to handle the intricacies of a contested adoption 
case. He did not seek to associate an experienced lawyer on the 
case and instead relied on informal assurances from opposing 
counsel because of his expertise.84 Though deceptive practices from 
Krigel may have played a part in his conduct, the birth father’s 
lawyer should have investigated further both legally and factually. 
Given that the birth mother resided in Missouri,85 it would not 
have been unexpected for the birth and adoption to occur in Mis-
souri and be subject to Missouri law. To appropriately protect the 
interests of the birth father, he should have filed in the putative 
father registry in Missouri. 
The complexities of adoption practice go beyond issues surround-
ing birth fathers, of course. One particularly vexing area involves 
the Indian Child Welfare Act (“ICWA”), which imposes additional 
 
 80. In re Krigel, 480 S.W.3d at 297, 300. 
 81. Brief for Informant, supra note 78, at 9.   
 82. Aizpuru, supra note 74, at 727.  
 83. Brief for Informant, supra note 78, at 14 n.3.  
 84. Id. at 22.   
 85. Id. at 5. The birth mother lived about fifteen miles from the birth father’s Kansas 
residence, but across the state line in Kansas City, Missouri. Id.  
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requirements in adoptions involving Indian children.86 In an 
Alaska case, a court found that the lawyers representing the adop-
tive parents did not act with the “skill, prudence, and diligence re-
quired of an attorney” when they failed to advise their clients to 
fully comply with the ICWA in securing the consent of the birth 
mother.87 The facts of the case are odd: the birth mother, the sister 
of the adoptive mother, became artificially inseminated with the 
adoptive father’s sperm.88 The birth/adoptive father was Chicka-
saw, potentially triggering all the protections of the ICWA even for 
the non-Indian birth mother.89 The birth mother’s consent needed 
to be affirmed in court before a judge, a step that the lawyers failed 
to do.90 The birth mother then challenged the adoption.91 Although 
the adoption was ultimately upheld, with the court ruling that the 
ICWA did not apply,92 the adoptive parents sued the lawyers for 
legal malpractice.93 They claimed that the lawyers were negligent 
in failing to follow the requirements of the ICWA, a subject in 
which they claimed expertise.94 That failure gave the birth mother 
grounds to challenge the adoption. The lower court ruled in favor 
of the lawyers, finding it to be “a mere error of judgment, . . . a 
point of law [upon] which reasonable lawyers could differ.”95 The 
appellate court disagreed, ruling that “the risk in failing to obtain 
the biological mother’s consent to the adoption in conformity with 
[the ICWA] should have been clear to any attorney possessed of the 
required level of professional competence.”96  
A lawyer’s incompetence is often revealed by her failure to take 
appropriate steps to protect a client’s rights in what may look like 
more straightforward cases as well. In In re Hagedorn, the lawyer 
in an adoption case was disciplined for failure to provide competent 
representation.97 While representing prospective adoptive parents, 
that lawyer failed to arrange for a required preplacement evalua-
tion of the prospective adoptive parents, and in fact seemed not to 
 
 86. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901 to 1923 (2012). 
 87. Doe v. Hughes, 838 P.2d 804, 807 (Alaska 1992). 
 88. Id. at 805. 
 89. In re Adoption of T.N.F., 781 P.2d 973, 973–74 (Alaska 1989). 
 90. Id. at 975.  
 91. Id. at 974. 
 92. Id. at 981–82. 
 93. Hughes, 838 P.2d at 806. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 806–07. 
 97. 725 N.E.2d 397, 399–400 (Ind. 2000) (per curiam). 
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realize the evaluation was necessary; failed to terminate the pa-
rental rights of the birth mother and father, having to belatedly 
notify the birth father by publication in order to terminate his 
rights; and failed to prepare or file a petition for adoption.98 Though 
the child was in the custody of the prospective adoptive parents for 
over two years, the lawyer failed to secure the adoption despite 
promises to do so.99 
The rule regarding competence requires lawyers to have the “le-
gal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably 
necessary for the representation.”100 What is reasonably necessary 
depends on the complexity and specialized nature of the matter, as 
well as the lawyer’s general experience.101 But that standard is not 
one of specialized expertise: “In many instances, the required pro-
ficiency is that of a general practitioner.”102 The comments to the 
rule provide, “[a] lawyer need not necessarily have special training 
or prior experience to handle legal problems of a type which the 
lawyer is unfamiliar . . . . A lawyer can provide adequate represen-
tation in a wholly novel field through necessary study.”103 A lawyer 
can also mitigate the issue by associating with a lawyer of estab-
lished competence in the field.104 At its core, however, “[c]ompe-
tence includes the ability to discern when an undertaking requires 
specialized knowledge or experience that a lawyer does not 
have.”105 A lawyer is expected to be familiar with basic well-settled 
principles of law and to possess the ability to analyze a client’s sit-
uation so as to apply the correct law to the facts.106 A lawyer is also 
 
 98. Id. at 398–99.  
 99. Id. at 399. Sometimes it is difficult to tell whether a lawyer’s failure is caused by a 
lack of competence—ignorance of what ought to be done—or a lack of diligence, in failing to 
do what she well knows ought to be done. Lack of diligence is also a violation of the rules of 
professional conduct. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019) (“A 
lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.”). The 
court in In re Hagedorn found a violation of rule 1.3 as well. 725 N.E.2d at 400.  
 100. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). 
 101. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). 
 102. Id. 
 103. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). 
 104. Id. When associating with another lawyer, the lawyer must obtain informed consent 
from her client and believe the other lawyer’s services will contribute to the competent rep-
resentation of the client. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 
2019). 
 105. BENNETT ET AL., supra note 11, at 27; see, e.g., In re Richmond’s Case, 872 A.2d 1023, 
1028 (N.H. 2005) (“Rule 1.1 mandates that a general practitioner must identify areas in 
which the lawyer is not competent . . . .”). 
 106. Christopher Sabis & Daniel Webert, Understanding the “Knowledge” Requirement 
of Attorney Competence: A Roadmap for Novice Attorneys, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 915, 919 
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expected to possess the necessary legal research skills “to ascertain 
applicable rules of law, whether or not commonly known or settled, 
using standard research sources.”107  
Lawyers must recognize that adoption is not simply a rosy-eyed 
“happy law.”108 The law is complex, and the consequences of mis-
takes are potentially grave. Even if a lawyer avoids sanction from 
a bar authority or legal malpractice liability, violations of legal eth-
ical rules can risk the finality of the adoption.109 While the require-
ment to provide competent representation is a clearly stated rule 
of professional responsibility, “[c]ertain routine decisions or prac-
tices—providing competent services, maintaining sufficient sup-
port staff, or communicating with clients—may not be thought of 
as raising ethical issues in the same ways as more egregious be-
haviors . . . .”110 This tendency toward “ethical fading,” the failure 
to “see” the ethical aspects of a decision, is an ethical blind spot 
attorneys must guard against.111 
B.  Candor 
A lawyer shall not knowingly: (1) make a false statement of fact 
or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of material 
fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer; . . . or (3) 
offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false.112 
A lawyer shall not[:] (b) falsify evidence, counsel or assist a wit-
ness to testify falsely, or offer an inducement to a witness that is 
prohibited by law.113 
In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not know-
ingly: (a) make a false statement of material fact or law to a third 
person; or (b) fail to disclose a material fact when disclosure is nec-
essary to  avoid  assisting  a criminal  or fraudulent  act  by  a  client 
. . . .114 
 
(2002). 
 107. BENNETT ET AL., supra note 11, at 27. 
 108. See sources cited supra note 19. 
 109. See discussion infra Sections II.C–F, III.B passim. 
 110. Robbennolt & Sternlight, supra note 14, at 1121.  
 111. Id. at 1120. 
 112. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). 
 113. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.4(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). 
 114. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). 
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While lawyers are obligated to represent the interests of their 
clients, lawyers are also officers of the court with an obligation to 
avoid undermining the integrity of the court’s process.115 That ob-
ligation to the court is heightened in ex parte proceedings—those 
proceedings where only one side is presenting the case to the tri-
bunal. Since there is no balance of presentation by opposing coun-
sel, the sole advocate present has the duty “to make disclosures of 
material facts known to the lawyer and that the lawyer reasonably 
believes are necessary to an informed decision.”116 That duty is es-
pecially strong when the lawyer’s failure to provide notice to the 
opponent is why the presentation is ex parte, as in adoption cases 
where the birth father is often not notified of the proceeding. 
A lawyer cannot, consistent with the Model Rules, offer evidence 
knowing it to be false.117 He cannot “ignore an obvious falsehood” 
when it is presented in court.118 A lawyer who unknowingly offers 
false evidence has an obligation to the tribunal to correct that false 
evidence.119 That obligation exists even if the testimony is elicited 
from his client by another lawyer’s examination, not his own.120 
Rule 3.3 clearly applies “to an attorney who fails to correct a mis-
statement to the court that was made in his presence by another 
attorney.”121 As one court put it:  
[A]s a general proposition, the prohibitions set forth in these [Model 
Rules] are not limited to affirmative misstatements of fact or law by 
an attorney. Indeed, we have recognized that, depending upon the cir-
cumstances, “silence can be no less a misrepresentation than words.” 
Therefore, our evaluation of the attorney’s discharge of his or her ob-
ligation is not simply a matter of considering the affirmative state-
ments and misstatements of counsel. Rather, if an attorney has an 
obligation to speak in order to comply with his or her duty of candor 
 
 115. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3 cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). 
 116. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3 cmt. 14 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019); see People 
v. Ritland, 327 P.3d 914, 921 (Colo. 2014) (sanctioning lawyer for failure to disclose in ex 
parte adoption proceeding where birth father was absent).  
 117. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3 cmt. 5 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). 
 118. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3 cmt. 8 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). 
 119. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3 cmt. 10 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Daniels v. Alander, 844 A.2d 182, 188 (Conn. 2004) (disciplining the associate who 
sat silently at counsel table while senior lawyer lied to the court for violating the rule re-
quiring candor to the tribunal); see also In re Bruno, 956 So. 2d 577, 578 (La. 2007) (per 
curiam) (sanctioning the lawyer who remained silent when another lawyer falsely claimed 
they had not paid a witness, when the silent lawyer knew he had paid the witness); Brund-
age v. Estate of Carambio, 951 A.2d 947, 956 (N.J. 2008). 
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to the tribunal, then silence also may also be a violation of the [Model 
Rules].122 
In the In re Krigel case, Krigel permitted false and misleading tes-
timony to be presented in court that portrayed a false impression 
that the birth father was not interested in the child or in asserting 
his parental rights.123 During the hearing on the birth mother’s 
consent to adoption, Krigel elicited testimony from the birth 
mother and sat silently while another attorney elicited testimony 
from the birth mother that was false or misleading.124 For example, 
the following exchange took place: 
Krigel: Now, [birth father] has been consulted at length about 
this matter, has he not? 
Birth mother: Yes. 
Krigel: You and Ms. Merryfield have met with him on at least 
one occasion. Has it been more than once? 
Birth mother: Just once. 
Krigel: Even though he has been consulted, he has not stepped 
forward since the birth of the child claiming any rights to the child? 
Birth mother: No.125 
This exchange lacked an appropriate disclosure to the court that 
the attorney had advised the birth mother not to inform the birth 
father about the birth, the adoption plans, or anything else.126 The 
birth father would have been hard pressed to step forward since 
the birth of the child, when the fact of the child’s birth had been 
concealed from him. Krigel also did not inform the court that the 
birth father had retained an attorney, instead creating the impres-
sion that the father had done nothing to assert his parental 
rights.127 And even if Krigel did not know about the birth mother’s 
lies to the birth father, he had to have known that the entirety of 
the testimony was wildly inaccurate and incomplete. Krigel made 
no attempt to correct the impression created by the examination of 
 
 122. Brundage, 951 A.2d at 956 (citation omitted). 
 123. 480 S.W.3d 294, 299 (Mo. 2016) (en banc).  
 124. Id. (finding that Krigel’s questioning of the birth mother was designed to mislead 
the court); Brief for Informant, supra note 78, at 35 (noting that Krigel was in the courtroom 
throughout the testimony of his client and discussing other attorney’s questioning of the 
birth mother while Krigel was present). 
 125. Brief for Informant, supra note 78, at 38–39.  
 126. In re Krigel, 480 S.W.3d at 297–98 (describing the “passive strategy” Krigel em-
ployed in his representation of the birth mother). 
 127. Brief for Informant, supra note 78, at 42.  
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the birth mother that the birth father, knowing about the birth, 
willfully shirked his responsibilities and showed no concern for the 
well being of the child.128 In Mississippi Bar v. Land, the lawyer 
ran afoul of the rules when he answered discovery in such a way 
as to be “not only unresponsive, but also misleading in that it 
tended to give the impression” of a false state of affairs.129 While 
lawyer Land’s statements may have been technically true, they 
“were calculated to deceive,”130 much like Krigel’s carefully con-
structed questions to the birth mother. 
Krigel also sat in silence when the guardian ad litem, Mann, 
questioned the birth mother, eliciting the following testimony: 
Mann: . . . [F]rom the time of conception until now, has [birth 
father] had the ability to make contact with you continuously if he 
wanted. 
Birth mother: Yes. 
* * * 
Mann: So there’s never been a gap in time where he could not 
communicate with you? 
Birth mother: No. 
* * * 
Mann: Did he know about when the due date was? 
Birth mother: Yes. 
* * * 
Mann: Has he come to the hospital?  
Birth mother: No.131 
At the time Krigel heard this testimony, he knew that he had 
advised against any contact with the birth father and knew that 
there were already steps taken to ensure that there would be no 
communication between his client and the birth father.132 Even if 
 
 128. In re Krigel, 480 S.W.3d at 299. 
 129. 653 So. 2d 899, 901, 907 (Miss. 1994) (en banc). The court concluded the lawyer 
failed to correct the mistaken impression he created that there were no reports or photo-
graphs related to a personal injury where the plaintiff was struck in the eye. Id. at 909. The 
plaintiff believed it was a rock thrown from a lawnmower, but the lawyer knew it was his 
client’s son shooting with a BB gun. Id. at 900, 903. There were reports and photographs 
related to the BB gun, but not the lawnmower. Id. at 900. 
 130. Id. at 908. 
 131. Brief for Informant, supra note 78, at 40–41. 
 132. In fact, at the hearing on attorney discipline, Krigel testified as follows concerning 
communication: 
Q.  Did you do anything to encourage communication between the young couple? 
A.  No, I suggested to my client that the parties’ agreement that had existed before I 
ever got involved in the case, that they only communicate through lawyers and that 
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he did not know that the birth mother lied about a later due date 
for the baby, he knew that the April 6 hearing was being held be-
fore the April 8 due date first communicated to the birth father.133 
He knew that if the birth mother had followed his no-contact ad-
vice, the birth father would not have known which hospital to go to 
even if he had known about the birth of the child.  
Further, Krigel filed a document falsely stating that the birth 
mother did not know of any person claiming to have custody or vis-
itation rights, though he knew full well that the birth father had 
such a claim.134 And Krigel lied to the birth father’s lawyer when 
he assured him that the child would not be placed for adoption 
without the father’s consent, though he had already determined to 
employ a “passive strategy” to cut out the birth father and allow 
the adoption without his consent.135 Omissions can be as dishonest 
as affirmative misrepresentations; “[a]ny differences between 
‘false’ and ‘misleading’ statements are irrelevant” under the 
rules.136 
A Utah lawyer was recently admonished for lack of candor when 
he misled the court in an adoption case where he represented an 
adoption agency.137 After the birth mother consented to adoption, 
a possible birth father’s attorney sent a letter to the adoption 
agency stating that he did not consent to the adoption.138 He filed 
to be declared the father and sought custody, and the adoption 
agency was served with the complaint.139 When a hearing to termi-
nate the natural father’s parental rights was held in a Utah court 
and the attorney appeared on behalf of the adoption agency, the 
 
there not be further communication between the birth mother and birth father, I sug-
gested to her my advice to her was that probably was a good idea under the circum-
stances. 
Id. at 26–30. 
 133. In re Krigel, 480 S.W.3d at 298; Brief for Informant, supra note 78, at 16–18, 57.  
 134. In re Krigel, 480 S.W.3d at 300.  
 135. Id. at 297–98. 
 136. See Douglas R. Richmond, Appellate Ethics: Truth, Criticism, and Consequences, 23 
REV. LITIG. 301, 310 (2004); see also In re Cardwell, 50 P.3d 897, 898–99 (Colo. 2002) (en 
banc) (holding the lawyer should have spoken up when client falsely denied prior convic-
tions); Daniels v. Alander, 844 A.2d 182, 188 (Conn. 2004) (holding the associate who sat 
silently at counsel table while senior lawyer lied to the court also violated rules requiring 
candor to the tribunal); In re Page, 774 N.E.2d 49, 49 (Ind. 2002) (per curiam) (holding the 
lawyer who remained silent while client lied, when the lawyer knew of credible evidence to 
the contrary, displayed lack of candor). 
 137. State Bar News: Attorney Discipline, 32 UTAH B.J. 57, 57 (May/June 2019). 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
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judge asked “whether there was anything he needed to know that 
would prevent the court from issuing the order terminating paren-
tal rights.”140 Although the attorney was aware of the lawsuit filed 
by the birth father, he “told the court only that they were aware 
that the named father had consulted a lawyer.”141 The court signed 
the order terminating the third party’s parental rights.142 The 
court later vacated the order citing the concealment of the com-
plaint as the basis for vacating the order.143 The case bears a strik-
ing resemblance to In re Krigel, with the attorney misleading the 
court via half-truths. 
Lack of candor to the tribunal is an offense courts are unlikely 
to overlook. But a lawyer’s obligation of candor extends beyond the 
court.144 “A lawyer is required to be truthful when dealing with 
others on a client’s behalf.”145 The obligation is more limited than 
that owed to the court, however.146 While a lawyer cannot lie to 
others, she “generally has no affirmative duty to inform an oppos-
ing party of relevant facts.”147 A duty to disclose arises only “when 
disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent 
act by a client,” and then only if disclosure is not prohibited by 
rules concerning confidentiality.148  
 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. Lack of candor was also an issue in a recent case out of Arizona, where the State 
sought to terminate the parental rights of a birth father so that the child could be adopted. 
Donald W. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 444 P.3d 258, 264, 268 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2019). The child 
was removed from the mother at birth because the mother had previously lost custody of a 
child due to neglect. Id. at 262 n.1. The father expressed a desire to parent his child and had 
taken a number of steps to develop a legal and emotional relationship with the child, even 
though the mother had moved to another state during the pregnancy and married another 
man. Id. at 262–64. Nonetheless, the State filed a petition alleging that the father was unfit 
and had abandoned or neglected the child. Id. at 263. The court chided the Department of 
Child Safety attorney for unethically filing a petition for termination, citing the Arizona 
version of the rules regarding candor: “The lack of factual support for the allegations in the 
petition relating to Father’s unfitness creates significant concerns about the ethical propri-
ety of filing the dependency petition claiming Father abused or neglected and abandoned 
Melody.” See id. at 268 n.4. The court pointed out potential ethical problems in having 
brought a legal action without basis in fact or law, and in the lawyer’s not having carefully 
determined the factual basis of the action before bringing it. Id. 
 144. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.1(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). 
 145. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.1 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). 
 146. RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN S. DZIENKOWSKI, LEGAL ETHICS: THE LAWYER’S 
DESKBOOK ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY § 4.1-1 (2018) (“A lawyer’s obligation [to the 
tribunal under Rule 3.3] are greater than a lawyer’s obligations under Rule 4.1.”). 
 147. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.1 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). 
 148. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.1(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). 
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In the In re Krigel case, the court sanctioned the attorney for the 
statement made to the birth father’s attorney, “indicating the child 
would not be adopted without Birth Father’s consent.”149 Krigel de-
nied that the statement was one of fact, claiming that he was 
merely explaining Missouri law of adoption since he knew the birth 
father’s lawyer was not well-versed in adoption law.150 But, of 
course, false statements regarding law, as well as false statements 
regarding facts, are proscribed by the rule.151 At the time he made 
that statement (whether of law or fact), he was employing a “pas-
sive strategy” designed to allow the adoption without the birth fa-
ther’s consent.152 Thus, at the time of making the statement, Krigel 
knew the statement of fact was false “and that his client, in fact, 
would seek to place the child for adoption without the father’s 
knowledge or consent.”153 Further, given his experience in adoption 
law, and his previous use of the “passive strategy” to shut out birth 
fathers, he would have been well aware that Missouri law did per-
mit adoptions without the consent of the birth father.154 False 
statements about facts and law are equally deserving of sanc-
tion.155 
While lawyers may be well aware of the obligation of candor, 
sometimes they seek to skirt as close to the line as they can because 
they feel an obligation to present the most favorable case possible 
in the interests of their clients. They may feel a conflict between 
their obligation of candor and their obligation to keep confidential 
certain matters disclosed by their clients. But lack of candor to the 
tribunal is an offense courts are likely to take very seriously. 
Courts may excuse other mistakes or take inexperience into ac-
count when lawyers make errors, but “inexperience does not go far 
in our view to excuse or to mitigate dishonesty, misrepresentation, 
or misappropriation. Little experience in the practice of law is nec-
essary to appreciate such actual wrongdoing.”156 
 
 149. In re Krigel, 480 S.W.3d 294, 299 (Mo. 2016) (en banc). 
 150. Brief for Informant, supra note 78, at 60 n.15.  
 151. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). 
 152. See discussion infra notes 162–66 and accompanying text (concerning the “passive 
strategy” employed by Krigel). 
 153. Brief for Informant, supra note 78, at 61.  
 154. Id. (noting that Krigel testified that he intends to keep using the strategy). 
 155. See, e.g., Idaho State Bar v. Eliasen, 913 P.2d 1163, 1164, 1167 (Idaho 1996) (disci-
plining lawyer for misstatement of law regarding consequences of failing to pay a judgment). 
 156. In re Cleland, 2 P.3d 700, 705 (Colo. 2000) (en banc) (per curiam). 
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C.  Respect for Rights of Others 
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means that have 
no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a 
third person . . . .157 
While a lawyer’s first duty is to the interests of the client, that 
duty “does not imply that a lawyer may disregard the rights of 
third persons.”158 Many of the cases under this rule prohibiting em-
barrassment, delay, or burden involve lawyers engaging in harass-
ing or embarrassing conduct.159 But there are cases where lawyers 
burdened a third person by interfering with their rights or impos-
ing unwarranted obligations; for example, in In re Royer, an attor-
ney was disciplined for arranging the sale of his client’s building in 
need of demolition to a homeless man for one dollar so that the 
client could avoid paying demolition costs.160 The sale burdened the 
purchaser with the costs of demolition, and since he would be una-
ble to pay, it burdened the city which would have to undertake the 
costs.161  
In In re Krigel, attorney Krigel was sanctioned under this provi-
sion because of his conduct toward the birth father.162 As the Office 
of Disciplinary Counsel said,  
Under the circumstances of this case, and given Respondent’s clear 
understanding as to the identity of the father, that the father was not 
willing to consent to an adoption, and that the father wanted to raise 
his child, Respondent’s conduct, including his conversation with [birth 
father’s lawyer], his instructions to the mother and her family to have 
no communication with the father, and his overall implementation of 
 
 157. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). 
 158. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.4 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). 
 159. See, e.g., People v. Beecher, 224 P.3d 442, 444 (Colo. 2009) (sanctioning the attorney 
for asking irrelevant questions about sexual abuse during deposition); Fla. Bar v. Buckle, 
771 So.2d 1131, 1132, 1134 (Fla. 2000) (per curiam) (disciplining a criminal defense lawyer 
for sending humiliating letter to crime victim intended to intimidate her into withdrawing 
complaint); In re Comfort, 159 P.3d 1011, 1017, 1021 (Kan. 2007) (per curiam) (reprimand-
ing the lawyer who wrote and published accusatory letter to another lawyer); In re White, 
707 S.E.2d 411, 413, 415 (S.C. 2011) (per curiam) (finding the lawyer’s letter calling town 
officials “pagans” deserved disciplinary action). 
 160. 78 P.3d 449, 452, 455–57 (Kan. 2003) (per curiam). 
 161. Id. at 457.  
 162. In re Krigel, 480 S.W.3d 294, 299–300 (Mo. 2016) (en banc).  
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his “passive strategy” to “actively do nothing,” had no substantial pur-
pose other than to impair and delay the father’s assertion of his pa-
rental rights . . . .163  
The purpose of the “passive strategy” was to delay the birth fa-
ther from learning facts necessary to his assertion of his legal 
rights.164 Since the date of the child’s birth would have triggered 
the fifteen-day deadline for filing in the putative father’s registry, 
keeping the date of birth from the birth father was important to 
the strategy.165 
Krigel’s strategy is a common one in adoption cases—ignore the 
birth father in the hopes that he will not successfully assert his 
parental rights and block the adoption.166 Indeed, an expert wit-
ness who testified on behalf of Krigel said that it was “reasonable 
and within the ordinary practice of Missouri adoption attorneys 
representing the birth mother to utilize the ‘passive strategy.’”167 
Even where the identity of the birth father is known to the attor-
ney, and he is represented by counsel, and he has made known his 
objection to the adoption and desire to parent, the expert witness 
testified, the “passive strategy” was appropriate.168 Indeed, in an 
amicus brief filed by professors of family law and professional re-
sponsibility, the professors say of the “passive strategy” utilized by 
Krigel, “it is an appropriate course of action that any competent 
lawyer (in an adoption or otherwise) could choose.”169 The brief of 
amici characterizes Krigel’s action as zealous representation of the 
client, fulfilling his obligation of loyalty and confidentiality in 
meeting the objectives of representation.170 The amici opine that 
neither the birth mother nor her attorney had any legal obligation 
 
 163. Brief for Informant, supra note 78, at 50. 
 164. Id. at 61. 
 165. See In re Krigel, 480 S.W.3d at 309–10; Brief for Informant, supra note 78, at 18 
(“The deliberate decision not to tell [birth father] the date of the birth of his own child was 
based upon Respondent’s legal advice and strategy.”); Brief for Informant, supra note 78, at 
61, (arguing the purpose of the passive strategy was to “keep [birth father] ‘in the dark’ 
regarding the events that would have triggered the father’s right to exercise his parental 
rights.”); see also MO. REV. STAT. § 453.030.3(2)(c) (requiring father to file in putative father 
registry within fifteen days of the child’s birth). 
 166. Seymore, Grasping Fatherhood, supra note 30, at 817, 846–47. 
 167. Brief for Informant, supra note 78, at 34. Krigel also testified that the passive strat-
egy was common among adoption attorneys, and that he would continue to utilize the strat-
egy in future adoption cases unless the Missouri courts ruled otherwise. Id. at 62. 
 168. Id.  
 169. Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors and Practitioners of Professional Responsibil-
ity and Family Law at 24, In re Krigel, 480 S.W.3d 294 (No. SC95098).  
 170. See id. at 47–58. 
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to inform the birth father of his rights or the facts necessary to 
assert his rights.171 Indeed, in the advisory comments to the rule 
requiring truthfulness in statements to others, the ABA makes 
clear that a lawyer “generally has no affirmative duty to inform an 
opposing party of relevant facts.”172 
The In re Krigel case is more complicated than mere passivity, 
however, as it is inextricably intertwined with deceit, misdirection, 
and obfuscation. As the court stated: 
Krigel advised Birth Mother and her family to have no contact with 
Birth Father and to not divulge any information to Birth Father re-
garding the birth of their child. Krigel communicated with Zimmer-
man, indicating that the child would not be adopted without Birth Fa-
ther’s consent. Further, Krigel advised Birth Mother and Birth Father 
to receive “counseling” from Merryfield, who was actively working 
with Birth Mother to place the child in an adoptive home. Despite ac-
tual knowledge that Birth Father wanted to raise the child, Krigel 
pursued a course of action that disregarded the parental rights of 
Birth Father and the best interests of the child in remaining with a 
natural parent. Krigel’s actions served no substantial purpose other 
than to impair and delay Birth Father’s assertion of his parental 
rights.173 
Thus, Krigel actively concealed information, not just passively 
failed to disclose information. He actively misled the birth father 
into “counseling” without disclosing the actual purpose of the rela-
tionship. And he communicated with counsel for the birth father, 
actively deceiving him about the adoption by assuring him that no 
adoption would happen without the birth father’s consent. 
Krigel’s conduct, in behavioral ethics terms, is a textbook exam-
ple of “ethical fading:” 
In order to avoid a conflict between their interests and principles, in-
dividuals are drawn to strategies that bleach out the moral content of 
their choices. Tendencies such as adopting euphemistic labels for in-
jurious conduct, or understating responsibility for acts of omission, al-
low the ethical dimensions of decision making to fade from view.174  
 
 171. Id. at 32–33. 
 172. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.1 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). 
 173. In re Krigel, 480 S.W.3d at 300. Although the court did not identify the child as a 
person burdened by Krigel’s conduct, such an argument could clearly be made. The court 
did recognize the “best interests of the child in remaining with a natural parent,” and Kri-
gel’s actions certainly interfered with that. Id. at 300. 
 174. Rhode, supra note 48, at 1322. 
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Using the neutral-sounding language of “passive strategy” al-
lows Krigel to fade the ethical dimensions of burdening the birth 
father’s interests in favor of his self-interest. 
After In re Krigel, it appears ethically risky to utilize the “pas-
sive strategy” of ignoring the rights of the birth father in hopes that 
he will not step forward to spoil the adoption, though without the 
active efforts at concealment at play in that case, it is uncertain 
that another court would reach the same conclusion as the In re 
Krigel court. It is a risky strategy for other reasons and might in 
fact show a lack of competence and diligence. As Elizabeth Brandt 
argues, “any system that finalizes an adoptive placement without 
notifying the father risks increased litigation at the moment of 
adoption.”175 The delay tactic is not ultimately in the best interests 
of the child, since disrupting an adoption placement after a child 
has bonded with the prospective adoptive parents is potentially 
harmful.176 A lawyer advising this strategy may also find himself 
and his clients subjected to liability for tortious interference with 
the birth father’s parental rights.177 
It is better to find out as early as possible if the birth father ob-
jects to the adoption or is interested in parenting. Notifying the 
birth father of the adoption may serve to assuage his concerns 
about adoption, leading to his consent.178 Seeking to exclude the 
birth father may actually cause objection to the adoption that shut-
ting him out is designed to avoid, since “[b]irthfathers who either 
openly or tacitly approved of adoption were predominately those 
who were permitted to participate in the proceedings, whereas 
those who opposed adoption were mainly those who had been ex-
cluded.”179 A lawyer can satisfy his ethical obligations of compe-
tence, diligence, loyalty, and confidentiality to the client, while re-
specting the rights of the birth father, by advising the birth mother 
or adoptive parent clients of the benefits of dealing with the birth 
father early and the dangers of ignoring his interests. 
 
 175. Brandt, supra note 70, at 222. 
 176. Id. at 223. 
 177. See sources cited supra note 72. 
 178. Brandt, supra note 70, at 224. 
 179. See Eva Y. Deykin et al., Fathers of Adopted Children: A Study of the Impact of 
Child Surrender on Birthfathers, 58 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 240, 243 (1988); see also 
Brandt, supra note 70, at 223–24 (“Moreover, the secrecy with which these cases move for-
ward may, in itself, result in polarization and mistrust leading to litigation that might not 
otherwise take place.”). 
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D.  Compensation from Someone Other Than Client 
A lawyer shall not accept compensation for representing a client 
from one other than the client unless: (1) the client gives informed 
consent; (2) there is no interference with the lawyer’s independence 
of professional judgement or with the client-lawyer relationship; 
and (3) information relating to representation of a client is protected 
as required by [rules regarding confidentiality].180 
A lawyer shall not permit a person who recommends, employs, or 
pays the lawyer to render legal services for another to direct or reg-
ulate the lawyer’s professional judgement in rendering such legal 
services.181 
Krigel represented the birth mother in the adoption case, though 
his fee was paid by the prospective adoptive family and he was re-
tained after recommendation of the adoption agency.182 This pat-
tern frequently occurs in adoption cases, with an attorney repre-
senting a birth parent who is unable to pay but whose fees are paid 
by the adoptive parents or an adoption agency.183 Such arrange-
ments, with third-party payers of attorney fees for the client, do 
present difficulties, however. 
Because third-party payers frequently have interests that differ 
from those of the client, including interests in minimizing the 
amount spent on the representation and in learning how the rep-
resentation is progressing, lawyers are prohibited from accepting 
or continuing such representations unless the lawyer determines 
that there will be no interference with the lawyer’s independent 
professional judgment and there is informed consent from the cli-
ent.184 
Further, this fee arrangement often creates ambiguity about 
who the lawyer is actually representing.185 A prospective adoptive 
parent paying the bills may believe he is the lawyer’s client, the 
birth parent may have that same understanding or may believe 
 
 180. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.8(f) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). 
 181. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.4(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). 
 182. In re Krigel, 480 S.W.3d 294, 307 (Mo. 2016) (Fischer, J., dissenting). 
 183. Statutes in a number of states permit this practice. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 
8800(d); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2115. 
 184. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.8(f) cmt. 11 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). 
 185. See Nancy J. Moore, Ethical Issues in Third-Party Payment: Beyond the Insurance 
Defense Paradigm, 16 REV. LITIG. 585, 603–109 (1997) (noting the importance of clarifying 
client identification). 
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she is the client, and the lawyer may also have a different under-
standing of who the client is. The lawyer may believe both parties 
are clients, which sets up a situation rife for a conflict of interest.186 
There may also be issues regarding the scope of representation—
the adoptive parents are likely only willing to pay for legal services 
related to the consent and relinquishment of parental rights, but 
not any attempt to revoke that consent.187 
Courts have approved arrangements whereby the adoptive par-
ents pay legal fees for the birth parent. In In re Adoption of Banda, 
the birth mother sought to revoke her consent because her lawyer 
was paid by the adoptive parents.188 The court held, in accordance 
with Ohio statutes, “the adoptive parents may agree to pay the 
birth mother’s attorney fees.”189 In order to satisfy the Model Rules, 
however, the attorney should exercise independent judgment on 
behalf of the client even when paid by the adoptive parents.190 Fur-
ther, the court outlined best practices for adoption cases: 
We are compelled to emphasize that while there is no evidence of any 
impropriety as to the fee arrangement here, such may not always be 
the result. The better practice is that the birth mother be solely re-
sponsible for her fees, or if the adoptive parents agree to the payment 
of the birth mother’s attorney fees, such payments must not be con-
tingent upon the outcome of placement or adoption. The agreement 
for payment of fees by the adoptive parents should be in writing and 
consented to by all parties concerned.191 
While noting that “there are concerns with the appearance of the 
petitioners or agency providing the independent counsel,” the Kan-
sas legislature has approved such payments of counsel represent-
ing minor birth mothers since “there is also an incentive for such 
 
 186. See infra Section II.F (discussing dual representation problems in adoption law).  
 187. An analogous issue was presented in In re Adoption of N.A.P., 930 P.2d 609, 612, 
614–15 (Kan. Ct. App. 1996). There, the birth mother was represented by independent coun-
sel as required by Kansas law for minors relinquishing parental rights. Id. at 611, 614. After 
representing the birth mother in the execution of her relinquishment documents, the attor-
ney, who was paid by the adoptive parents, declined to represent her when she went to him 
to revoke her consent. Id. at 614. The court held that the statute requiring independent 
counsel was satisfied by the initial representation and did not guarantee representation 
throughout the adoption proceeding. Id. at 614–15. Such a limited scope of representation 
would have to be adequately explained and consented to by the client. See MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT  r. 1.2(c)  (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019) (“A lawyer may limit the scope of the rep-
resentation if the limitation is reasonable under the circumstances and the client gives in-
formed consent.”). 
 188. 559 N.E.2d 1373, 1376–77 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988). 
 189. Id. at 1381. 
 190. Id.  
 191. Id. at 1383.  
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persons to insure a valid instrument is obtained and, consequently, 
to provide minors with attorneys who are truly independent of the 
petitioner or agency.”192 
Payments to the birth parent’s attorney by the adoptive parents 
or adoption agency creates the appearance, if not the reality, that 
the attorney will be more supportive of the interests of the adoptive 
parents or agency in ensuring the adoption is finalized. While the 
Model Rules allow the practice, the attorney must take great care 
to represent only the interests of the client, not the person paying 
the bills. The Model Rules require the lawyer to exercise independ-
ent judgment in the interests of the client, so the attorney must 
carefully guard against even unconscious bias in favor of the adop-
tive parents. Any appearance of bias may well provide grounds for 
the birth mother to challenge her consent in court. 
E.  Fees 
A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, or collect an 
unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses.193 
Fees, including lawyer fees, are regulated in adoption194 because 
of concerns about commodification of children,195 and both the ap-
pearance and reality of baby-buying and baby-selling.196 States 
criminalize baby-buying and baby-selling,197 though there can be 
 
 192. In re Adoption of N.A.P., 930 P.2d at 614 (quoting FAMILY LAW ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE OF THE KANSAS JUDICIAL COUNCIL, COMMENTS TO 1990 ADOPTION AND 
RELINQUISHMENT ACT cmt. 5 S.B. 431 (1990)). 
 193. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.5(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). 
 194. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-114; IOWA CODE ANN. § 600.9; MICH. COMP. 
LAWS § 710.54; S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-9-310(F); see also UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 7-102 (UNIF. 
LAW COMM’N 1994) (regulating unlawful payments related to adoption); UNIF. ADOPTION 
ACT § 7-103 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1994) (regulating lawful payments related to adoption). 
 195. See Margaret Jane Radin, Market Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1925–27 
(1987) (discussing commodification in the context of blood, organ, and baby-buying and sell-
ing). 
 196. Joan Heifetz Hollinger, Types of Adoptions § 1.05, in 1 ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE 
(Joan Heifetz Hollinger ed., 2019) [hereinafter Hollinger, § 1.05] (noting that in independent 
adoptions there is “the potential for black market transactions: the limited supply of adopta-
ble babies, in contrast to the great demand for them, is said to generate incentives to un-
scrupulous birth parents, lawyers, and other intermediaries to sell babies at whatever price 
prospective adopters are willing to pay”). 
 197. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 181 (prohibiting the buying and selling of any persons); 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 273 (making it an offense “to pay, offer to pay, or to receive money or 
anything of value for the placement for adoption or for the consent to an adoption of a child”); 
TEX. PENAL CODE § 25.08 (stating that for purposes of adoption, it is an offense if a person 
“offers to accept, agrees to accept, or accepts a thing of value for the delivery of the child to 
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considerable disagreement in distinguishing between these clearly 
prohibited practices and the permissible payment of fees and ex-
penses in adoption.198 High fees are not inevitable in adoption; 
adoption agencies did not initially charge fees to adoptive par-
ents,199 and until 1945, adoption agencies “maintained that finan-
cial transactions between adopters and agencies were strictly un-
ethical.”200 In other countries, adoption is exclusively government-
run and does not entail high fees.201 But high fees in American 
adoption is de rigeur.202 And lawyers earn a portion of those fees. 
Although law is a learned profession, as distinguished from a 
trade or business, it is not unreasonable for a lawyer to expect to 
be paid for his work.203 The factors to be considered in judging the 
reasonableness of the fee include the time and labor involved, the 
novelty and difficulty of the issues involved, the fee customarily 
charged for similar legal services, and the experience and reputa-
tion of the lawyer.204 Lawyers can charge fees contingent on the 
outcome in appropriate cases, but one leading adoption practi-
tioner suggests contingent fees are not appropriate in adoption 
cases: 
Contingent fees are not appropriate in adoptions. Whether the contin-
gency is locating a child, having the child placed with the prospective 
adoptive parents, obtaining the birth parents’ consents, or success-
fully completing the adoption, a contingent fee suggests child selling 
 
another” or “offers to give, agrees to give, or gives a thing of value to another”); WASH. REV. 
CODE § 9A.64.030. In Thacker v. State, 889 S.W.2d 380, 384, 397 (Tex. App. 1994), the sole 
proprietor of an adoption agency was convicted of baby-buying because of payments made 
to a prospective birth mother. 
 198. Hollinger, § 1.05, supra note 196 (“[C]onsiderable uncertainty remains as to what 
constitutes an unlawful payment in connection with an adoption.”). 
 199. Danielle Saba Donner, The Emerging Adoption Market: Child Welfare Agencies, Pri-
vate Middlemen, and “Consumer” Remedies, 35 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 473, 487 (1996). 
 200. ELLEN HERMAN, KINSHIP BY DESIGN: A HISTORY OF ADOPTION IN THE MODERN 
UNITED STATES 45 (2008). 
 201. See, e.g., Lloyd Nelson, US vs. UK: International Differences in Fostering and Adop-
tion, FOSTER CARE NEWSLETTER (Sept. 1, 2017), http://foster-care-newsletter.com/us-vs-uk-
international-differences-in-fostering-and-adoption/ (“Whilst a private adoption in the U.S. 
can cost anywhere between $20,000 and $40,000, U.K. adoptions—much like adoptions 
through the state in the U.S.—are almost entirely without cost, with U.K. parents often 
paying just a small court fee to apply to adopt their matched child.”) [https://perma. 
cc/M9MV-ELUL].  
 202. ADAM PERTMAN, ADOPTION NATION: HOW THE ADOPTION REVOLUTION IS 
TRANSFORMING AMERICA 189 (2000). 
 203. Eugene R. Gaetke & Sarah N. Welling, Money Laundering and Lawyers, 43 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1165, 1182, 1182 n.85 (1992) (noting the origin of lawyers’ discomfort in 
discussing fees arises from the fact that law is a learned profession). 
 204. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.5(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). 
SEYMORE 542.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/8/20 12:58 PM 
492 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:461 
and that the attorney’s professional objectivity is compromised by the 
incentive to satisfy the condition. In a dual representation, a contin-
gent fee militates against the attorney’s giving equal recognition to 
protecting the birth mother’s rights; the contingency is invariably an 
event at least theoretically a step closer to terminating the birth 
mother’s parental rights and thus hostile to her legal interests.205 
According to that same practitioner, “[a]doption attorneys com-
monly charge a set fee or an hourly rate. . . . The most straightfor-
ward adoption will take at least 15 professional hours to complete 
proficiently; any set fee, or cost estimate, should reflect that expec-
tation.”206 According to an annual survey at Adoptive Families 
Magazine, newborn adoption using an adoption attorney averages 
$37,829, with $13,780 attributable to attorney fees.207 Using an 
adoption agency, the newborn adoption averages $43,239, with 
$4435 attributable to attorney fees.208 In adoption from foster care, 
the average cost is $2938, with $947 attributed to attorney fees.209 
Thus, attorney fees in adoptions can vary widely. 
In In re Krigel, the lawyer earned more than $20,000 as his fee 
for representing the birth mother and admitted that he worked less 
than ten hours on the case.210 Interestingly, Krigel’s law firm’s web 
page includes an article about the costs of adoption, with a re-
minder that “[i]t is best to know upfront what fees and expenses 
you can anticipate so you can plan and budget accordingly.”211 The 
judge, who ultimately removed the child from the prospective adop-
tive parents and placed legal custody with the birth father, ques-
tioned the amount of the fee, noting the large amount “for a mini-
mal role in the litigation.”212 Though the Model Rules prohibit 
lawyers from charging an unreasonable fee, Krigel was not charged 
 
 205. Jed Somit et al., Formalizing the Legal Relationships § 5.04, in 1 ADOPTION LAW 
AND PRACTICE (Joan Heifetz Hollinger ed., 2019); see also In re Adoption of Banda, 559 
N.E.2d 1373, 1383 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988) (holding that payment of fees cannot be contingent 
on placement or adoption); Pamela K. Strom Amlung, Conflicts of Interest in Independent 
Adoptions: Pitfalls for the Unwary, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 169, 188 (1990) (noting that payment 
of fees contingent upon the adoption’s finalization may present conflict of interest). 
 206. Somit et al., supra note 205.  
 207. Editorial Team, Adoption Cost and Timing in 2016–2017, ADOPTIVE FAMILIES, 
https://www.adoptivefamilies.com/resources/adoption-news/adoption-cost-timing-2016-20 
17-survey-results/ [https://perma.cc/2499-6WTS].  
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. 
 210. In re Krigel, 480 S.W.3d 294, 307 (Mo. 2016) (Fischer, J., dissenting). 
 211. Understanding the Costs of Adoption, KRIGEL & KRIGEL (Nov. 5, 2015), https://www. 
krigelandkrigel.com/understanding-the-costs-of-adoption/ [https://perma.cc/Q65H-NA46]. 
 212. In re Krigel, 480 S.W.3d at 309–10 (Breckenridge, C.J., dissenting in part, concur-
ring in part). 
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with violating this rule.213 Yet, “[c]harging a lot for doing very little 
is just as likely to violate Rule 1.5(a) as charging for doing noth-
ing.”214  
 F.  Dual Representation/Conflict of Interest 
[A] lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation in-
volves a concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent conflict of in-
terest exists if: (1) the representation of one client will be directly 
adverse to another client; or (2) there is a significant risk that the 
representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by 
the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client.215 
One of a lawyer’s primary obligations to a client is singular loy-
alty and independent judgment: 
The principle of loyalty of lawyer to client is a basic tenet of the Anglo-
American conception of the lawyer-client relationship. . . . Where 
choices have to be made between the interest of a client and any other 
person—whether the lawyer personally or another client, the lawyer 
must be in such a position that all options that might favor the client 
can be considered free from the likely impairment of any interest other 
than those of the client.216 
Thus, a lawyer cannot represent two clients when their interests 
are directly adverse—like representing both husband and wife in 
a divorce217 or representing both the buyer and seller of real es-
tate.218 Even without direct adversity, however, a lawyer’s repre-
sentation of multiple clients may impinge on the duty of loyalty by 
limiting the lawyer’s “ability to consider, recommend or carry out 
 
 213. See Information at 8–9, In re Krigel, 480 S.W.3d 294 (No. DHP 14-001). 
 214. BENNETT ET AL., supra note 11, at 79.  
 215. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). The rule provides 
an exception that permits dual representation when a lawyer reasonably believes that she 
is able to provide competent and diligent representation despite the conflict, and the repre-
sentation is not prohibited by law. Each affected client also has to give informed consent in 
writing. Finally, the representation is still prohibited if it involves representation in the 
same litigation or before the same tribunal. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(b) (AM. 
BAR ASS’N 2019). 
 216. CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 7.1.3 (1986). 
 217. See, e.g., Vinson v. Vinson, 588 S.E.2d 392, 394, 398–99 (Va. Ct. App. 2003). 
 218. See, e.g., Iowa Supreme Court Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Wagner, 599 N.W.2d 
721, 722–23 (Iowa 1999); In re Herriott, No. 2010-9790/A, 2014 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 119, at 
*3–4, *10–11 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. Jan. 17, 2014). 
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an appropriate course of action for the client” because of the law-
yer’s obligation of loyalty to the other client.219  
A lawyer’s obligation to keep the confidences of a client can cre-
ate a conflict between two clients. The obligation to keep secret one 
client’s information may violate the duty of loyalty to the other cli-
ent to whom the information may be relevant and useful.220 For 
example, in the context of adoption, consider a case where the 
adoption attorney tries to represent both the birth mother and the 
birth father: 
If, for example, the birth father abruptly wishes to contest the adop-
tion, “reasonable steps to avoid reasonably foreseeable prejudice” may 
logically include assisting him in filing a timely challenge or paternity 
action; yet such conduct would overtly violate the duty owed to the 
birth mother wishing the adoption to continue. Warning the birth 
mother of the father’s changed intention may be necessary to avoid 
harm to her; yet this can hardly be squared with the attorney’s duty 
to protect the birth father and to maintain his confidences.221 
Where the birth mother is represented by the same counsel as 
adoptive parents, or her independent counsel is paid by adoptive 
parents, “the birth mother may assume that her questions or any 
sign of hesitation will immediately be conveyed to their attorney; 
the resulting inability to talk freely with the attorney vitiates the 
purpose of separate representation.”222 
An adoption lawyer seeking to represent both the prospective 
adoptive parents and the prospective birth mother will often face 
conflicts of interest. As one lawyer notes, “At first blush, one might 
regard the objectives and interests of birthparents, prospective 
adoptees, and adoptive parents in every adoption as wholly con-
sistent and aligned toward a common goal: the timely and perma-
nent placement of a child in a loving and proper home.”223 But as 
is readily evident, “[a]n adoption is a highly emotional undertaking 
 
 219. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 8 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). 
 220. ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 146, at § 1.7-1(a). 
 221. See Somit et al., supra note 205. 
 222. Id.  
 223. Hope C. Todd, Speaking of Ethics: Ethical Mandates in Private Adoptions, WASH. 
LAW. 12 (Mar. 2014), https://www.dcbar.org/bar-resources/publications/washington-lawyer/ 
articles/march-2014-speaking-of-ethics.cfm [https://perma.cc/MJ7B-QPF9]; see also Somit 
et al., supra note 205 (arguing that dual representation is beneficial because “the conflict of 
interest between adopting parents and birth parents is often more hypothetical than real” 
with dual representation allowing “the adoption to be planned and proceed efficiently as a 
cooperative effort” based on “the shared interest in the welfare of the child”). 
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for both the adoptive and the biological parent[,]”224 and even when 
interests might align at first, parties can change their minds for 
any reason in the course of the adoption case.225 For that reason, 
the ABA Commission on Ethics and Professional Responsibility is-
sued an informal opinion holding that “[a] lawyer may not ethically 
represent both the adoptive and biological parents in a private 
adoption proceeding.”226 The Commission reasoned that the rights 
surrendered by the birth parents and granted to the adoptive par-
ents are in potential conflict, and “[t]he biological parent’s right to 
revoke the consent is in direct conflict with the interests of the 
adoptive parent.”227 Since each is entitled to independent advice 
from their attorney, they cannot both be appropriately advised by 
the same attorney; “[t]he inherent conflicts cannot be recon-
ciled.”228  
New York takes a very firm stand against dual representation 
in adoptions.229 In In re Michelman, Stanley B. Michelman was 
suspended from the practice of law for three years after represent-
ing both the birth mother and the adoptive parents in two private 
adoptions.230 He was sanctioned despite his argument that the 
adoptions were completed successfully and both sets of adoptive 
parents and birth mothers were satisfied with the outcomes.231 He 
had been previously admonished by the Grievance Committee 
 
 224. ABA Comm’n on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Informal Op. 87-1523 (1987). 
 225. Todd, supra note 223, at 12. 
 226. ABA Comm’n on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, supra note 224. 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. The Commission found support for its conclusion by relying on opinions of sev-
eral state bar authorities. See State Bar of Michigan Ethics, Op. 156 (1953); New York State 
Bar Ass’n Prof’l Ethics Comm., Op. 68 (1968); North Carolina State Bar Ethics, Op. 38 
(1947); Virginia State Bar Ethics, Op. 741 (1986). Since the ABA opinion was issued, other 
bar authorities have also ruled that dual representation in adoption cases is unethical. See 
Oregon State Bar, Formal Op. No. 2005-28 (2005); Pa. Ethics, Op. 95-59 (1995); Wisconsin 
State Bar Ethics, Op. E-88-4 (1988). A number of states have also banned dual representa-
tion in adoption by statute. See Amanda Tamayo, A State Survey—Dual Representation in 
Adoption, 27 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAWS., 481, 485–88 (2015).  
 229. Katherine G. Thompson & Douglas H. Reiniger, The Need for and Importance of 
Separate Representation of the Parties in a Private-Placement Adoption § 6.01, in 1 
ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE (Jennifer Heifetz Hollinger ed., 2019). 
 230. 616 N.Y.S.2d 409, 409–10, 412 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (per curiam). 
 231. Id. at 411–12. Michelman’s argument exhibits a classic outcome bias in ethical rea-
soning, where ethicality is judged not from the intentions of the actors but rather from 
whether the outcome is considered favorable or unfavorable. Bazerman & Sezer, supra note 
44, at 100–01.  
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three times for representing adoptive parents and biological par-
ents in the same proceeding.232 In one case where Michelman was 
the attorney, the trial court refused to accept the birth parents’ ex-
trajudicial consent to the adoption because Michelman advised 
them while representing the adoptive parent: 
    Conversations between a natural parent and the adoptive parents’ 
attorney, no matter how extensive, do not provide the assurance an 
adoption court needs that the natural parent fully understood her 
rights and options. The adoption process is typically a highly emo-
tional undertaking for both natural and adoptive parents. . . . Since a 
natural parent gives up her superior position by signing an extrajudi-
cial consent and has 45 days to revoke it, there is an inescapable con-
flict of interest between the two sets of “parents.” It is evident that an 
attorney for adoptive parents cannot be fully dedicated to achieving 
the goals of his clients and at the same time be relied upon to ensure 
that the natural parent’s relinquishment of her rights was knowing, 
intelligent and voluntary. Indeed, that attorney has, at the very least, 
a strong incentive to persuade her on behalf of his clients that surren-
der of the child is the best course of action.233 
A conflict of interest because of dual representation will not only 
potentially subject a lawyer to discipline, it may also put the adop-
tion at risk. A court may conclude that the birth mother’s consent 
is invalid because she did not have the services of an independent 
counsel, and even if the adoption is ultimately upheld, the dual 
representation provides one more point from which to argue the 
invalidity of the consent.234 
Sometimes lawyers will seek to “cure” the dual representation 
problem by representing the adoptive parents and leaving the birth 
parent unrepresented. Consider the case of Tammy Lemley. 
Tammy’s boyfriend convinced her to relinquish their child for adop-
tion and took her to an attorney’s office where she eventually 
signed a consent to the adoption.235 But she was under age, making 
her consent void under Ohio law.236 The lawyers told her after she 
turned eighteen that she needed to sign more papers—actually, 
she needed to sign papers once she reached majority because the 
previous papers were void.237 That same day, Tammy’s parents 
went to the lawyers to ask for the return of the child and pointed 
 
 232. In re Michelman, 616 N.Y.S.2d at 411–12.  
 233. In re Male D., 523 N.Y.S.2d 369, 369, 372 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1987) (citation omitted). 
 234. See discussion infra notes 253–62 and accompanying text.  
 235. Lemley v. Barr, 343 S.E.2d 101, 102–03 (W. Va. 1986).  
 236. See id. at 103 (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5103.16). 
 237. Id. 
SEYMORE 542.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/8/20 12:58 PM 
2020] ADOPTION LAWYERING 497 
out that Tammy’s consent was void because she was underage.238 
The lawyers refused, having already delivered the child to a couple 
in West Virginia for adoption.239 The courts of Ohio ruled that 
Tammy’s consent was invalid,240 and the West Virginia court 
granted full faith and credit to that ruling.241 When Tammy 
brought a legal malpractice action against the lawyers who de-
ceived her, the courts ruled in favor of the lawyers.242 Legal mal-
practice requires that a lawyer breach a duty to a client, and 
Tammy Lemley was never the client, the adoptive parents were.243 
Of course, the issue may not be quite as clear-cut as the general 
rule that nonclients cannot sue for legal malpractice; courts may 
find that a lawyer owes a duty to nonclients in some circum-
stances.244 And a court might also find that the lawyer was actually 
 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. The court ruled that the lawyers “had obtained Tammy’s consent through du-
ress, that she had no understanding of her position at the time she signed the adoption 
papers and, therefore, her consent was invalid.” Id. 
 241. Id. at 104–05. 
 242. Lemley v. Kaiser, No. 1804, 1987 Ohio App. LEXIS 6674, at *1, *3–4 (Ohio Ct. App. 
Apr. 30, 1987). 
 243. Id. at *11–13. (“It is clear that no formal, explicit [attorney-client] relationship ex-
isted. A retainer was never signed, Miss Lemley paid no legal fees to the Kaiser firm, nor 
did the firm ever send her a bill.”). Interestingly, Krigel, whose case is discussed elsewhere, 
was previously sued for legal malpractice by birth parents who claimed he gave them faulty 
advice about the revocability of their consent to adoption. Collins v. Mo. Bar Plan, 157 
S.W.3d 726, 730–31 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005). He defended by arguing that he was not in fact 
representing them. Id. at 736. The appellate court concluded that the birth parents had 
presented sufficient evidence to create an issue of fact on that point and remanded for the 
lower court to determine whether there was an attorney-client relationship. Id.  
 244. Seymore, Adopting Civil Damages, supra note 8, at 952–55 (discussing legal mal-
practice liability in adoption cases, including liability to non-clients); see also 7 AM. JUR. 2D 
Attorneys at Law § 221 (2017) (“Attorneys may owe a duty of care to nonclients when the 
attorneys know, or should know, that nonclients will rely on the attorney’s representations 
and the nonclients are not too remote from the attorneys to be entitled to protection.”); Alan 
L. Cohen, Liability to Non-Clients for Malpractice, in 3 PERSONAL INJURY–ACTIONS, 
DEFENSES, DAMAGES § 11.06 (Mary James Courtenay ed., 2018) (“An adversary party may 
have a cause of action against an attorney for fraudulent, malicious, or intentional misrep-
resentations.”); Developments in the Law—Lawyers’ Responsibilities and Lawyers’ Re-
sponses, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1547, 1551 (1994) (“Where once only the client could bring a 
malpractice action against the lawyer, now third parties can bring lawsuits . . . .”). 
SEYMORE 542.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/8/20 12:58 PM 
498 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:461 
representing the birth mother, despite disclaimers to the con-
trary.245 Further, dealing with an unrepresented birth mother pre-
sents other ethical issues, addressed elsewhere in this Article.246 
One argument offered in support of dual representation is that 
the realistic alternative is unrepresented—or poorly represented—
birth parents: 
Often, the birth parents don’t want separate representation, some-
times to spare the cost, often because they recognize they don’t want 
advice, just closure on the pregnancy. . . . Moreover, the ideal of sepa-
rate representation is seldom realized. The birth parents often elect 
no representation when dual representation is prohibited or declined, 
and instead get their adoption information secondhand through the 
adopting parents.247 
While an attorney representing both parties may be conflicted, 
the argument goes, at least that the attorney owes a duty to both 
parties. Where dual representation is prohibited, “[s]ince the adop-
tive parents’ attorney has a duty to represent his clients zealously 
but has no corresponding duty to the birth mother, the Model 
Rules’ prohibition may put her in a worse situation than if she had 
no advice at all.”248 Further, a birth parent’s attorney “is seldom 
paid commensurate with the adoptive parents’ attorney.”249 In Cal-
ifornia, the statutory fee for independent counsel for birth parents, 
to be paid by adoptive parents, is “up to a maximum of five hundred 
dollars ($500) for that representation, unless a higher fee is agreed 
to by the parties.”250 The typically low rate paid to birth mothers’ 
 
 245. See, e.g., Tierney v. Flower, 302 N.Y.S.2d 640, 644 (N.Y. App. Div. 1969) (finding 
lawyer represented birth mother, though he had been claimed he was exclusively represent-
ing the prospective adoptive parents). 
 246. There are ethical issues in a lawyer’s interaction with an unrepresented birth par-
ent, as well as issues surrounding dual representation. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT r. 4.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019); discussion infra notes 304–16 and accompanying text. 
 247. Somit et al., supra note 205; Thompson & Reiniger, supra note 229. 
 248. Sharon Fast Gustafson, Note, Regulating Adoption Intermediaries: Ensuring That 
the Solutions Are No Worse than the Problem, 3 GEO. J. LEG. ETHICS 837, 862 (1990). 
 249. Somit et al., supra note 205. 
 250. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8800(d). As a point of comparison, one matrix of hourly attorney 
fees that are considered reasonable ranged from $307 per hour for attorneys with less than 
two years of experience to $613 per hour for attorneys with over thirty years of experience. 
USAO Attorney’s Fees Matrix—2015–2019, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, https://www.justice. 
gov/usao-dc/file/796471/download [https://perma.cc/C33P-PVQ5]. Recall that Krigel testi-
fied that he spent approximately ten hours representing the birth mother and charged 
$20,000 for that representation. In re Krigel, 480 S.W.3d 294, 307 (Mo. 2016) (en banc) 
(Fischer, J., dissenting). The fee approved in California would amount to less than two hours 
of representation at the less-experienced end of the scale. 
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attorneys caused one commentator to argue that “the resulting 
quality of representation may be inferior.”251 
A number of jurisdictions permit dual representation of birth 
parents and prospective adoptive parents in at least some circum-
stances, reasoning that the birth parents and the adoptive parents 
have similar interests, each side only interested in appropriate 
placement for the child.252 California permits an attorney to repre-
sent both the prospective adoptive parents and the birth parents 
so long as written consent is obtained after informing the birth par-
ents that they are entitled to representation by independent coun-
sel paid for by the adoptive parents, and they waive the right to 
that representation.253 One commentator argues that “if the requi-
site full disclosure is given to each client in a private adoption, the 
result will not be the client’s consent to dual representation. On 
the contrary, the client will recognize the dangers of dual represen-
tation.”254 This position presumes, however, that the attorney is 
motivated to thoroughly explain the danger of dual representation, 
when in reality, “the lawyer has an incentive to phrase her expla-
nation in a way that encourages the client to waive the conflict.”255 
After all, dual representation ensures more legal work and conse-
quently more attorney fees. Consent to dual representation may 
also be impaired by the highly emotional nature of the decision of 
a birth mother to relinquish parental rights, such that she “may be 
unable to comprehend the potential problems that may arise when 
her lawyer attempts to represent not only her interests, but also 
those of persons whose interest is in permanently obtaining her 
child for themselves.”256  
 
 251. Somit et al., supra note 205. 
 252. Tamayo, supra note 228, at 483 (“The attorney has the ability to represent both 
clients without creating a conflict of interest as they cooperatively work towards a common 
goal of adoption.”); Linda Jean Davie, Note, Babes and Barristers: Legal Ethics and Lawyer-
Facilitated Independent Adoptions, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 933, 945 (1984) (“[T]he two sides 
are coming together for the same basic goal—namely, the transfer of custody and 
parenthood of a child—and that the interests of the parties are not conflicting at all.”). 
 253. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8800(d); see also Arden v. State Bar, 341 P.2d 6, 8–13 (Cal. 1959) 
(en banc) (permitting attorney’s dual representation of birth mother and adoptive parents 
because both consented, though the lawyer was publicly reprimanded for dishonesty in help-
ing the birth mother hide her pregnancy from her parents and for secretly recording a con-
versation with her and threatening to use the tape to have her prosecuted for extortion when 
she sought to revoke her consent to the adoption). 
 254. Thompson & Reiniger, supra note 229. 
 255. Fred C. Zacharias, Waiving Conflicts of Interest, 108 YALE L.J. 407, 422 (1998) (foot-
note omitted). 
 256. See Davie, supra note 252, at 949. 
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The Kansas courts have held that so long as there is no actual 
conflict, dual representation is permissible: 
In adoption cases, such as this, the attorney can represent both the 
natural and adoptive parents. The attorney owes both sets of parents 
a duty to provide good faith advice concerning the legal consequences 
of their acts. This multiple representation can continue so long as no 
conflict develops between the parties. However, if a conflict occurs, the 
attorney must choose which conflicting interest he or she will repre-
sent.257 
Representing both parties until a conflict arises, and then with-
drawing when it does so, is risky in a number of ways. It is likely 
to delay proceedings as the now-unrepresented parties need to se-
cure new counsel at a critical and newly contentious phase of the 
proceedings.258  
The conflicted representation may also serve as grounds for chal-
lenging the validity of the birth mother’s consent, significantly dis-
advantaging the adoptive parents.259 In Adoption of Alexander S., 
the appellate court chided the attorney representing both parties: 
“[u]nder any standards, [the birth mother] did not receive repre-
sentation of counsel at a time when she needed it most.” The court 
further noted the attorney’s “failure to act on behalf of his client 
during the critical period when she expressed her unwillingness to 
consent.”260 Even if arguments about dual representation vitiating 
consent ultimately prove unsuccessful, the possibility of dual rep-
resentation provides one more avenue for seeking to undo the 
adoption and thereby increases costs, delays finality, and adds to 
stress for all. 
It is not only dual representation of the birth parents and adop-
tive parents that may prove problematic. In one case, the court 
found an impermissible conflict when the same attorney repre-
sented the adoption/foster agency and the prospective adoptive 
parents.261 The agency had supervised the child’s foster placement 
 
 257. In re Adoption of Baby Boy Irons, 684 P.2d 332, 340 (Kan. 1984); see also In re Baby 
Girl T, 21 P.3d 581, 589 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001) (permitting legal representation of both the 
adoptive parents and the birth parents so long as the attorney obtains consent after fully 
disclosing the foreseeable consequences of the dual representation). 
 258. Thompson & Reiniger, supra note 229; see also Zacharias, supra note 255, at 419 
(noting the existence of a danger of delay in permitting waiver of potential conflicts). 
 259. See, e.g., Adoption of Alexander S., 235 Cal. Rptr. 761, 767, 769–70 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1987), vacated on jurisdictional grounds, 750 P.2d 778, 785 (Cal. 1988). 
 260. Id. at 769 (emphasis omitted). 
 261. In re Adoption of Vincent, 602 N.Y.S.2d 303, 304 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1993). 
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with the prospective adoptive parents, and when a second home 
study found deficiencies in the home, the lawyer had the child re-
moved from the home, and the agency opposed the adoption.262 The 
court held that the prospective adoptive parents needed to be rep-
resented by new counsel, not the attorney who was also represent-
ing the agency that was no longer advocating for the adoption.263 
“Clearly the agency attorney could not act both for the agency that 
originally consented to the adoption and for the prospective adop-
tive parent.”264 The conflict was clear, and the prospective adoptive 
parents deserved “a lawyer who will deal with the agency only for 
the benefit of the [adoptive parent] and the [adoptive parent]’s de-
sire to complete the adoption.”265 
Dual representation may also present a conflict of interest when 
an attorney represents competing sets of adoptive parents seeking 
to adopt the same child. In In re Petrie, a couple seeking to adopt 
contacted attorney Petrie, who said he did not currently know of 
any adoptable children, but that if the couple were to find such a 
child, he would represent them in the adoption.266 Some eighteen 
months later, the couple, through a mutual friend, learned of a 
birth mother seeking to place a child and arranged for her to be 
referred to Petrie.267 Petrie notified the couple that he now had a 
child available for them, and they responded positively. Shortly 
thereafter, Petrie received a call from another couple seeking to 
adopt.268 By this time, the lawyer believed he was representing the 
birth mother who believed that she had no obligation to the first 
couple, so he advised the birth mother to place the child with the 
second couple.269 The court sanctioned Petrie for violations of the 
rules of professional conduct, noting, “In a situation involving in-
dependent sets of adoptive parents and only one available child, 
obviously one set of parents will be disappointed. An attorney can-
not simultaneously represent both sets of adoptive parents without 
 
 262. Id. at 304–05. 
 263. Id. at 305. 
 264. Id.   
 265. Id.  
 266. 742 P.2d 796, 798 (Ariz. 1987) (en banc). 
 267. Id.  
 268. Id. at 798–99.  
 269. Id. at 799, 804. Petrie recommended placement with the second couple because they 
were local and placing the child with the first couple would require him to travel to their 
county of residence, something he was “not excited” about. Id.  
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compromising his representation of one of them.”270 The court also 
noted that it might be possible for an attorney ethically to repre-
sent multiple parties to an adoption, but that would only be per-
mitted with disclosure and consent, which did not happen here.271  
Permitting dual representation of birth parents and adoptive 
parents seems particularly odd in light of other similarly prohib-
ited conflicts. For example, a lawyer is not permitted to represent 
both the buyer and seller in a real estate transaction.272 For the 
buyer and seller, “what one party gets the other must concede,”273 
a description that is equally apt in an adoption when representing 
both the birth parents and the adoptive parents. Given the im-
portance of the interests at play in adoption—constitutionally pro-
tected parental rights and the best interests of the child—inde-
pendent counsel, unimpaired by dual loyalty, is essential.274 In 
many states, there are few protections to ensure a birth mother’s 
rights are secured. She does not have to appear before a judge or 
other public official to confirm the validity of her relinquishment, 
and in private adoptions, there may not be a potentially neutral 
adoption worker or social worker to counsel her.275 Thus, a birth 
mother’s lawyer is the only potential buffer to ensure that her con-
sent is free from duress or coercion.276 A lawyer representing the 
adoptive parents as well as the birth parent may, even uncon-
sciously, privilege the interests of the person paying his fee.  
 
 270. Id. at 800. 
 271. Id.  
 272. See sources cited supra note 218.  
 273. State Supreme Court Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Wagner, 599 N.W.2d 721, 
7216 (Iowa 1999) (quoting CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 434 (1986)). 
 274. See Seymore, Sixteen & Pregnant, supra note 29, at 154–55.   
 275. A birth mother can waive all rights to appear and to even receive notice of the adop-
tion proceedings in her initial out-of-court consent. See, e.g., TEX. FAMILY CODE § 
161.103(c)(1) (allowing affidavit for voluntary relinquishment of parental rights to contain 
waiver of process in termination and adoption suit); UNIFORM ADOPTION ACT  § 2-406 (UNI. 
LAW COMM’N 1994) (permitting waiver of notice in consent or other written document); Joan 
Heifetz Hollinger & William M. Schur, Notice, Process and In Personam Jurisdiction § 4.10, 
in 1 ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE (Joan Heifetz Hollinger ed., 2019) (acknowledging ac-
ceptance of pre-suit waivers of process in adoption and termination of parental rights pro-
ceedings); Seymore, Sixteen & Pregnant, supra note 29, at 154 (“Though adoption is a legal 
process, it is not uncommon for a birth mother never to set foot in the courtroom.”). 
 276. In re J.M.P., 528 So. 2d 1002, 1019–20 (La. 1988) (Calogero, J., dissenting) (“Thus, 
the attorney who represents the surrendering parent is the only person who is assigned, in 
the Louisiana statutory scheme, to stand between that parent and those who might seek to 
influence the adoption decision.”). 
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G.  Self-Interest and Other Conflicts of Interest 
[A] lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation in-
volves a concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent conflict of in-
terest exists if . . . there is a significant risk that the representation 
. . . will be materially limited by . . . a personal interest of the law-
yer.277 
Representation of adverse parties may impair duties of loyalty 
and independence, but so too may a lawyer’s own personal inter-
ests that are potentially adverse to a client’s interest.278 In Okla-
homa Bar Association v. Stubblefield, the attorney was approached 
by a pregnant woman interested in placing her child for adop-
tion.279 He agreed to help her find adoptive parents, and told her 
that if he did so he would be representing the adoptive parents, not 
her, in any adoption proceedings.280 The birth mother also retained 
him to represent her in other legal matters unrelated to the poten-
tial adoption.281 Stubblefield found a prospective adoptive couple 
desiring to adopt a male child, but then Stubblefield and his wife 
decided they wished to adopt the female child instead.282 The birth 
mother consented to relinquish her parental rights and place the 
child for adoption, but did not know that Stubblefield and his wife 
were adopting the child.283 
Shockingly, the court refused to rule retrospectively that Stub-
blefield should be sanctioned regarding the adoption, finding that 
“reasonable minds could and do differ regarding an attorney adopt-
ing his/her client’s child.”284 But prospectively, such conduct was a 
different matter: 
 
 277. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(a)(2) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019).   
 278. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(a) cmt. 10 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). 
 279. State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Stubblefield, 766 P.2d 979, 980 (Okla. 1988). 
 280. Id. 
 281. Id. The other representation was in relation to criminal charges and in seeking cus-
tody of a child from a previous marriage. Id. She later asked him to help her complete a 
divorce proceeding that she had commenced with another attorney. Id. In preparing docu-
ments for the divorce, Stubblefield included in the petition a statement that no children had 
been born of the marriage and that the petitioner was not pregnant. Id. Because he did not 
disclose the pregnancy in the divorce petition, he “prevented the trial court in the adoption 
proceeding from determining whether there was a living biological father of the child, from 
whom consent to adopt was required.” Id. at 983. 
 282. Id. at 981. 
 283. Id. at 981–82 (“[T]he client purportedly had no knowledge of the adoption until after 
her consent became irrevocable and the adoption was granted.”).  
 284. Id. at 982–83. Justice Simms dissented, writing, “I disagree with the majority . . . . 
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    However, we find an attorney, after today, must not adopt the child 
of his/her client in a private adoption proceeding unless the attorney 
withdraws from representation and refers the client to another lawyer 
who can give independent legal counsel. The ramifications of adoption 
proceedings are broad inasmuch as they affect three distinct interests: 
the natural parents, the child and the adoptive parents. Potential con-
flicts do exist between these interests.285 
Thus, the court ruled, a relinquishing parent must be afforded 
independent legal counsel, a lawyer whose legal advice “is not po-
tentially or actually colored by his/her own self-interest in the 
child.”286 Independent legal counsel ensures the integrity of private 
adoptions, but more importantly serves “to avoid subsequent emo-
tionally traumatic custodial changes of the adopted child.”287 
The idea that it is not sanctionable for a lawyer to adopt the child 
of a birth mother he is advising or representing is astonishing. 
When it comes to business transactions with clients, the Model 
Rules recognize that a lawyer’s legal training, together with the 
trusting relationship between the lawyer and potentially less pow-
erful client, “create the possibility of overreaching.”288 A lawyer 
cannot enter into business transactions with a client unless the 
terms are fair and reasonable to the client, and disclosed in a writ-
ing transmitting those terms in a manner that can be understood 
by the client.289 The client must also be advised in writing that they 
should seek the advice of independent legal counsel and be given a 
reasonable opportunity to do so.290 Finally, the client must give in-
formed consent in a writing signed by the client that outlines the 
transaction terms and the role of the lawyer in the transaction.291 
Stubblefield took none of these steps necessary to protect a client 
from an overreaching attorney in a business transaction when 
adopting his client’s child without her knowledge.292 If he had been 
buying his client’s business or house rather than adopting her 
 
I view respondent’s conduct as a clear and gross conflict of interest. I would have thought it 
beyond need for any discussion that a lawyer who had this relationship with his client and 
adopted her child without fully disclosing the facts to her and without her knowledge or 
consent, was unquestionably guilty of unprofessional conduct and flagrant self-dealing.” Id. 
at 985.  
 285. Id. at 983 (majority opinion). 
 286. Id.  
 287. Id. 
 288. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.8 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). 
 289. Id. 
 290. Id. 
 291. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.8(a)(3) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019).  
 292. Stubblefield, 766 P.2d at 983. 
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child, his course of conduct would have clearly run afoul of the 
Model Rules.293 
In another case where a lawyer was sanctioned for adopting the 
child of the birth mother who approached her about the adoption, 
the court ruled on grounds of lack of candor that the lawyer vio-
lated the rules of ethics.294 But it is quite evident that conflict of 
interest played a significant part in the lawyer’s missteps. A Cana-
dian birth mother reached out to a distant relative, lawyer Ritland, 
when she desired to place her child for adoption. She asked the 
Ritlands to consider adopting her baby.295 Since the Ritlands had 
been trying unsuccessfully to conceive for more than a year, she 
had become “obsessed” with having a baby.296 Ritland had not han-
dled adoption cases before297 so she began to research and discov-
ered that Canadian children could not be easily placed in American 
families, that the birth mother was not considered a close enough 
relative to qualify as a family placement adoption, and that a home 
study for a nonfamily placement was beyond her financial 
means.298 The birth mother informed her the birth father was out 
of the picture,299 so Ritland concocted a scheme whereby her hus-
band would be listed as the birth father on the child’s birth certifi-
cate, making him the legal father, and then after the requisite 
 
 293. See sources cited supra note 7.  
 294. People v. Ritland, 327 P.3d 914, 916, 921 (Colo. 2014). 
 295. Id. at 916. The court concluded that Ritland was not representing any client in the 
matter, not the birth mother and not her husband who she endeavored to make the legal 
father of the child by falsifying the birth certificate. Id. at 921, 927.  
 296. Id. at 918.  
 297. Taking on a matter without the competence to do so is another potential violation. 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). Indeed, Ritland argued that 
her lack of experience should be viewed in mitigation of punishment, but the court rejected 
her argument. Ritland, 327 P.3d at 923–24 (quoting In re Cleland, 2 P.3d 700, 705 (Colo. 
2000) (“[I]nexperience does not go far in our view to excuse or to mitigate dishonesty, mis-
representation, or misappropriation. Little experience in the practice of law is necessary to 
appreciate such actual wrongdoing.”)). 
 298. Ritland, 327 P.3d at 918.   
 299. Id. at 916. She readily believed the birth mother who said that the birth father had 
ordered her to have an abortion and threatened to kill both her and the baby if she did not 
have an abortion. Id. at 917–18. She also related that he had “taken off,” leaving no contact 
information. Id. at 917. She believed the birth mother because her professional background 
in domestic violence led her to believe the birth mother was genuinely in fear. Id. at 917–
18. It is, of course, quite possible that her desire for a child caused her to accept this expla-
nation too readily. 
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waiting period, Ritland would adopt the child in a stepparent adop-
tion.300 The plan was carried out, with Ritland creating false affi-
davits and false pleadings which were filed in court.301 The biolog-
ical father eventually filed for custody in Canada, leading to the 
falsehoods being revealed.302  
Although none of the sanctions in Ritland involved conflicts of 
interest, the court did recognize that the attorney acted with self-
interest.303 But quixotically the court excused her selfish motiva-
tion because it “arose in part from a deep yearning for a child, gen-
uine concern that [the birth mother] could not properly care for a 
baby, and a desire to protect [the child] from upheaval, consistent 
with her professional commitment to serving children in need.”304 
But it is precisely these motivations that created a conflict of inter-
est that allowed her to systematically disregard the interests of the 
birth father and generate falsehoods for the court. The court also 
considered Ritland’s struggles with infertility, leading to “feelings 
of desperation” and “heartbreak.”305 The court further stated: “[W]e 
believe that Respondent’s desire to have a child exerted a powerful 
emotional pull over her and that this yearning helps to explain Re-
spondent’s decision to engage in the misconduct at issue.”306 The 
court also relied on Ritland’s “unwavering professional dedication 
to helping children in need” in her other professional endeavors.307 
It was all of these “pulls” on her judgment that led Ritland into 
error. The basis of all the conflict of interest rules requires lawyers 
to be able to identify when conflicts of interest impair their judg-
ment, recognizing that when a lawyer’s interests are at play, “it 
may be difficult or impossible for the lawyer to give a client de-
tached advice.”308 Ritland should have been able to objectively rec-
ognize that her personal interests could have been coloring her per-
spective on the case. She should have referred the birth mother to 
an independent lawyer, someone who did not have a stake in the 
outcome of the case.  
 
 300. Id. at 918. 
 301. Id. at 918 n.7.  
 302. Id. at 918–19. 
 303. Id. at 915, 923. 
 304. Id. at 923. 
 305. Id. 
 306. Id. at 923–24. 
 307. Id. at 924–25. 
 308. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT  r. 1.7 cmt. 10 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). 
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As Ritland illustrates, conflicts of interest may materially im-
pair a lawyer’s representation of a client simply because the law-
yer’s personal beliefs that may be relevant to adoption.309 As the 
influential Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers states, a 
conflict may be altruistic rather than financial and may “result 
from a lawyer’s deeply held religious, philosophical, political, or 
public-policy beliefs.”310 In In re J.M.P., the court addressed a po-
tential conflict when attorney Perez became involved in the adop-
tion because of his anti-abortion views.311 The birth mother was 
given his name at a health clinic as an “anti-abortionist attor-
ney.”312 He handled this adoption case, without charging a fee to 
either birth family or adoptive family, in line with his anti-abortion 
views.313 Although the court upheld the adoption on other grounds, 
making it unnecessary to address the conflict-of-interest issue 
raised by Perez’s anti-abortion views, it noted that “his represen-
tation may have been materially limited by his own interest in pre-
venting abortions by promoting adoptions.”314 One justice dis-
sented to upholding the adoption, believing that attorney Perez did 
have a conflict surrounding his anti-abortion views: 
   The record demonstrates that Perez was personally biased in favor 
of the adoption, to the point that he believed that the adoption should 
go forward even after he learned from [birth mother’s mother] that 
[birth mother] had expressed the desire to keep her child. Although 
Perez testified at the adoption hearing that his primary interest was 
 
 309. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 125 (AM. LAW INST. 
2000).  
 310. Id. at § 125 cmt. c; see also Teresa Stanton Collett, Professional Versus Moral Duty: 
Accepting Appointments in Unjust Civil Cases, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 635, 640 (1997) 
(discussing the propriety of rejecting representation on moral or religious grounds); Bruce 
A. Green, The Role of Personal Values in Professional Decisionmaking, 11 GEO. J. LEG. 
ETHICS 19, 37 (1997) (explaining a lawyer may not make decisions to achieve objectives 
defined by the lawyer’s personal moral or religious beliefs when they conflict with the cli-
ent’s wishes).  
 311. 528 So. 2d 1002, 1004 (La. 1988). As one commentator noted in reference to the 
issue of counsel appointed to represent minor girls seeking abortions,  
the irresoluble conflict of interest confronting any pro-life attorney required to 
assist a girl in obtaining an abortion. Such representation would place the at-
torney’s belief in the sanctity of human life in direct opposition to her profes-
sional commitment to loyally seek her client’s objectives. A conflict involving 
such fundamental beliefs would necessarily impact the attorney-client rela-
tionship and should be avoided. 
Collett, supra note 310, at 642. Seeking to encourage adoption in order to avoid abortion 
could present the same conflict.  
 312. In re J.M.P., 528 So. 2d at 1004. 
 313. Id. 
 314. Id. at 1012. 
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in seeing the child born, and that once the birth occurred he had no 
personal interest in encouraging [birth mother] to go through with the 
adoption, the majority overlooks the fact that Perez admitted that he 
did not advise Roberts about [birth mother’s] reservations because he 
personally believed that the adoption was in the child’s best inter-
ests.315 
Other parts of the rules of professional conduct recognize that a 
lawyer’s personal feelings might impair representation so as to cre-
ate a conflict of interest. For example, the Model Rules permit a 
lawyer to withdraw from a case when “the client insists upon tak-
ing action that the lawyer considers repugnant or with which the 
lawyer has a fundamental disagreement.”316 A lawyer may also 
avoid a court-appointed case if “the client or the cause is so repug-
nant to the lawyer as to be likely to impair the client-lawyer rela-
tionship or the lawyer’s ability to represent the client.”317 Thus, 
when a client wishes to decline further appeals and accept the 
death penalty, an attorney “to whom the death penalty is ‘repug-
nant,’ may seek leave to withdraw from the representation.”318 And 
in a case discussing appointed counsel for minors seeking abortion, 
one court opined that an attorney who “had strongly held religious 
or moral beliefs about the wrongfulness of abortion” would be ex-
pected not to accept a court appointment.319 These requirements 
are motivated, at least in part, by avoidance of exactly the kind of 
conflict of interest that arises when a lawyer represents a client 
despite a lawyer’s deeply held religious, philosophical, political, or 
public policy beliefs. 
Many lawyers who handle adoption cases have some relation-
ship to adoption, with many of them being adoptive parents. Even 
those without a personal connection to adoption have a positive 
view of adoption, perhaps to the extent of presenting a conflict of 
interest that may bias their lawyering advice in adoption cases. As 
two long-time adoption practitioners note,  
 
 315. Id. at 1021 (Calogero, J., dissenting). 
 316. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.16(b)(4) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). 
 317. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 6.2(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). 
 318. Red Dog v. State, 625 A.2d 245, 247 (Del. 1993) (per curiam). 
 319. Ind. Planned Parenthood Affiliates Ass’n v. Pearson, 716 F.2d 1127, 1137 (7th Cir. 
1983). But see Bd. Prof’l Responsibility Supreme Court Tenn. Formed Ethics, Op. 96-F-140 
(1996) (intimating that a lawyer cannot refuse appointment in such a case, even where “[t]he 
religious beliefs are so compelling that counsel fears his own personal interests will subject 
him to conflicting interests and impair his independent professional judgment”). 
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It is also too easy for attorneys to become caught up in the view that 
family formation work always exemplifies goodness and morality, pos-
sibly causing them to disregard the interests of the other parent as 
the lawyer marches toward the goal of creating a new and legally rec-
ognized parent/child relationship.320 
Adoption lawyers need to guard against allowing their personal 
views to skew their objective, independent advice in adoption 
cases. 
H.  Dealing with Unrepresented Persons 
In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not repre-
sented by counsel, a lawyer shall not state or imply that the lawyer 
is disinterested. When the lawyer knows or reasonably should know 
that the unrepresented person misunderstands the lawyer’s role in 
the matter, the lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to correct the 
misunderstanding. The lawyer shall not give legal advice to an un-
represented person, other than the advice to secure counsel, if the 
lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the interests of such 
a person are or have a reasonable possibility of being in conflict with 
the interests of the client.321 
“An unrepresented person, particularly one not experienced in 
dealing with legal matters, might assume that a lawyer is disinter-
ested in loyalties or is a disinterested authority on the law even 
when the lawyer represents a client.”322 That is the crux of the 
problem when a birth mother interacts with the adoptive parents’ 
attorney. Despite the limitations of Rule 4.3, the language does not 
express a complete prohibition on dealing with unrepresented per-
sons, leading one commentator to declare, “[t]he professional ethics 
of the American bar overtly permit attorneys to knowingly exploit 
the ignorance and inexperience of unrepresented litigants.”323 This 
is so, so long as the lawyer explains to the nonclient that he is not 
a disinterested party, and he offers no conflicted legal advice be-
yond the advice to seek counsel.324  
 
 320. Prescott & Debele, supra note 18, at 153.   
 321. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). 
 322. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.3 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). 
 323. Haneman, supra note 40, at 707. 
 324. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). 
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Because very few states mandate that a birth parent be repre-
sented by counsel in an adoption, they are commonly unrepre-
sented.325 Birth parents are often confused on this point, believing 
that the lawyer representing the adoptive parents is, in fact, their 
attorney. There is every reason for that confusion—the birth 
mother may have approached the lawyer herself, seeking help in 
placing the child.326 That initial contact can create the impression 
that the lawyer is “her” lawyer. He will explain to her the laws 
concerning adoption, outline her legal rights, and discuss the steps 
in the legal process of adoption that pertain to her. Then the lawyer 
will prepare documents for the birth mother’s signature—the re-
linquishment of parental rights affidavit, the adoption consent, 
etc.—furthering the impression that he is doing legal work for her. 
One court has held that actions of this type in fact created an at-
torney-client relationship between the lawyer and the birth 
mother:  
In addition, it may be noted that, while the appellant maintained that 
he never represented the petitioner and her parents and acted only 
for his anonymous clients, it is our view that actually the appellant 
represented both sides of the transaction in which he acted. At times 
when the petitioner had no attorney of her own, the appellant not only 
acted for his clients but he also prepared papers for the petitioner’s 
signature and advised her of her right to appear and object in the pro-
posed adoption proceedings.327 
But in Tammy Lemley’s case, a court found that the lawyers 
were not representing the birth mother despite similar actions.328 
The court conceded that Tammy might have believed the lawyers 
were representing her, but held that the law firm “engaged in no 
representations or conduct which could reasonably induce 
[Tammy] to believe they represented her.”329  
Best practices in adoption would be for each party to be repre-
sented by independent counsel, but if a lawyer representing adop-
 
 325. Samuels, supra note 67, at 75 (“In practice, when separate representation is not 
required by law, birth parents generally are unrepresented.”); Seymore, Sixteen & Pregnant, 
supra note 29, at 101. 
 326. See, e.g., People v. Ritland, 327 P.3d 914, 923 (Colo. 2014); State ex rel. Okla. Bar 
Ass’n v. Stubblefield, 766 P.2d 979, 980, 983  (Okla. 1988); Lemley v. Barr, 343 S.E.2d 101, 
102–03 (W. Va. 1986).  
 327. Tierney v. Flower, 302 N.Y.S.2d 640, 644 (N.Y. App. Div. 1969). 
 328. Lemley v. Kaiser, No. 1804, 1987 Ohio App. LEXIS 6674, at *13 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 
30, 1987). 
 329. Id. 
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tive parents acquires consent or relinquishment from the birth par-
ents, he must carefully explain that he is not the birth parents’ 
lawyer. Even that may not be sufficient to avoid unethical lawyer-
ing. Given the significant potential for conflict of interest,330 a law-
yer can still violate the Model Rules if giving legal advice other 
than advice to secure counsel.331 Further, an attorney may find 
himself subject to liability for legal malpractice, despite the usual 
rule that a lawyer cannot be liable for breaches of duty to noncli-
ents.332 “[A]ttorneys may owe a duty of care to nonclients when the 
attorneys know, or should know, that nonclients will rely on the 
attorney’s representations and the nonclients are not too remote 
from the attorneys to be entitled to protection.”333 
I.  Confidentiality 
A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representa-
tion of a client unless the client gives informed consent . . . . A law-
yer shall make reasonable efforts to prevent the inadvertent or un-
authorized disclosure of, or unauthorized access to, information 
relating to the representation of a client.334 
“A fundamental principle in the client-lawyer relationship is 
that, in the absence of the client’s informed consent, the lawyer 
must not reveal information relating to the representation.”335 
When there is dual representation of a birth parent and an adop-
tive parent, the duty of confidentiality can be a concern. Joint rep-
resentation may prevent the attorney-client confidentiality privi-
lege from attaching, making any confidences shared with the 
lawyer admissible in court.336 A desire by one jointly represented 
party to prevent disclosure to another party creates a conflict of 
interest, potentially requiring withdrawal of the lawyer from rep-
resenting both parties.337  
 
 330. See discussion supra Section II.F.   
 331. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). 
 332. See Lemley, 1987 Ohio App. LEXIS 6674, at *11–13.  
 333. 7 AM. JUR. 2D Attorneys at Law § 221 (2017). 
 334. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). 
 335. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). 
 336. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 30 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). 
 337. Id.; see also discussion supra notes 218–28 and accompanying text. 
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Confidentiality and adoption traditionally go hand in hand, with 
a long history of secrecy in adoption.338 Wayne Carp, noted adop-
tion historian, quotes a family court judge rebuking a birth mother 
seeking access to information about her child placed for adoption: 
“secrecy is the foundation underlying all adoptions and if this se-
crecy is not to continue this great work must suffer.”339 While 
forced secrecy is changing today, with the advent of open adoption 
and access to original birth certificates and adoption records in 
some jurisdictions,340 the lawyer’s promise of confidentiality still 
applies. 
Lawyers in adoption cases have used the obligation of confiden-
tiality to hide the identity of the adoptive parents when birth par-
ents have sought to challenge the adoption. In Lemley v. Barr, the 
prospective adoptive parents directed the attorneys not to reveal 
their identities when the birth mother sought return of her child: 
   The Barrs knew about the Ohio habeas corpus proceeding through 
their discussions with [their lawyer] and through news reports both 
on television and in print. They discussed whether to appear physi-
cally in the Ohio proceedings, whether they should comply with the 
judgment of the Ohio trial court, and whether they should divulge 
their identities. The Barrs knowingly and intentionally refused to re-
veal their names, and directed [their lawyers] to exercise the attorney-
client privilege on their behalf.341 
It took two years and two months after Tammy filed in court 
before court processes resulted in an order that the names of the 
prospective adoptive parents be revealed. The prospective adoptive 
parents utilized that time of secrecy, while well aware of the Ohio 
court action, to file for adoption in West Virginia.342 Tammy was 
required to bring further litigation in West Virginia to seek return 
of her child, and though she prevailed on all legal issues, the West 
Virginia Supreme Court remanded for further proceedings to de-
cide what was in the best interest of the child, now five years old, 
who would, in the court’s words, lose “the only family this child has 
 
 338. Seymore, International Adoption, supra note 33, at 168–73. 
 339. CARP, supra note 66, at 106 (internal quotations omitted). 
 340. Seymore, International Adoption, supra note 33, at 164. Even the Academy of Adop-
tion and Assisted Reproduction Attorneys have promulgated a resolution advocating open 
access to adoption records. ACAD. OF ADOPTION & ASSISTED REPROD. ATTORNEYS, 
RESOLUTION REGARDING ADOPTED PERSONS’ ACCESS TO ADOPTION RECORDS (2018), https:// 
adoptionart.org/about-aaaa/publications/resolutions/ [https://perma.cc/3RLL-DTCU].  
 341. 343 S.E.2d 101, 103 (W. Va. 1986). 
 342. Id. 
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ever known” if returned to his legal mother.343 Thus, the delaying 
tactic of insisting on confidentiality to hide their identity worked 
to the benefit of the prospective adoptive parents.344  
The tactic was less successful for the prospective adoptive par-
ents in Tierney v. Flower.345 As in Lemley, the prospective adoptive 
parents instructed their attorney not to reveal their identities or 
whereabouts when the birth mother sought return of the child.346 
The adoptive parents’ attorney argued in court that such disclosure 
would violate the obligation of confidentiality.347 The lawyer also 
declined to state whether the adoption papers had been filed, 
claiming that “such a response was also of privileged nature since 
adoption papers were generally sealed so as not to become a matter 
of public record.”348 The court was unpersuaded, in light of the best 
interest of the child: 
   In our opinion, there is no competent reason why the Supreme Court 
should uphold the claim of confidential relationship between the ap-
pellant and his clients to the point of sealing their identity where the 
safe and proper custody of a child is involved, particularly where, as 
at bar, the infant is out of the custody of his mother and is not lodged 
in the custody of persons who have any legal authorization for their 
assumption of control over the infant. The Supreme Court’s overriding 
concern with the welfare of the infant as a ward of the court overbal-
ances any interest of technical claim on the appellant’s part with re-
spect to the confidential relationship between him and his clients.349 
 
 343. Id. at 104–05, 109. 
 344. Advising delay, so long as the prospective adoptive parents are in possession of the 
child, is a familiar tactic in adoption cases. An Associated Press story quotes an adoption 
attorney advising delay, saying the longer the child can bond with the prospective parents 
before an adoption notice is filed, the better. “‘Time is your friend,’ [attorney] Dove had said.” 
Allen G. Breed, A Dying Man’s Race To Adopt—and a Small Miracle, NBC NEWS.COM, (Sept. 
25, 2011, 11:51:40 AM ET), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/44597789/ns/health-health_care/t/ 
dying-mans-race-adopt-small-miracle/#.XO2CHaROlhE [https://perma.cc/3X42-DXWH]. 
Justice Sotomayor has warned of the danger of the parent-in-possession scenario, strongly 
suggesting that the law should not reward them: “[T]he law cannot be applied so as auto-
matically to ‘reward those who obtain custody, whether lawfully or otherwise, and maintain 
it during any ensuing (and protracted) litigation.’” Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 570 U.S. 
637, 692 (2013) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holy-
field, 490 U.S. 30, 54 (1989). And in that case, where the birth father was actually the parent 
in possession, the majority had no trouble returning the child to the prospective adoptive 
parents. Id. at 645–46, 651. 
 345. 302 N.Y.S.E.2d 640, 643–45 (N.Y. App. Div. 1969).  
 346. Id. at 641–42. 
 347. Id. at 642. 
 348. Id.  
 349. Id. at 643. 
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The court further opined that, as beneficent as the requirement 
of confidentiality might be in the usual case, “the surreptitious 
withholding of the petitioner’s child by the anonymous clients and 
their failure so far to proceed with the proposed adoption proceed-
ing wherein the petitioner could register her present objection to 
adoption and demand the return of her child might be a cloak for 
wrongdoing.”350 
In the context of other legal processes involving children—child 
custody in divorce, for instance—commentators have noted that 
confidentiality rules may be incompatible with the best interests 
of the child.351 In zealously representing the singular interest of 
the client, the lawyer must respect rules of confidentiality that 
hide potentially relevant information from the fact finder which 
may make a true determination of best interests difficult.352 Rules 
of confidentiality also prevent adult adoptees and birth parents 
from reuniting. States seal original birth certificates and adoption 
records,353 and though the lawyer in the case would have posses-
sion of all the information, the Model Rules surrounding confiden-
tiality would prevent their disclosure, absent a waiver by the cli-
ent.354  
The legal profession places the obligation of confidentiality high 
in importance, while adoption is trending away from its history of 
secrecy and suppression. Increased openness offers many benefits 
for all members of the adoption triad and also shines light on po-
tential adoption corruption which flourishes in darkness. Thus, the 
rules of confidentiality enforced by legal ethics may well have neg-
ative consequences in the long run. 
 
 350. Id. at 643–44; cf. Seymore, International Adoption, supra note 33, at 168 (arguing 
that “openness in international adoption is a practical solution to fraud, corruption, and 
trafficking in international adoption by using the ‘sunlight as disinfectant’ method”).  
 351. Mary Kay Kisthardt, Working in the Best Interest of Children: Facilitating the Col-
laboration of Lawyers and Social Workers in Abuse and Neglect Cases, 30 RUTGERS L. REC. 
1, 3 (2007); Janet Weinstein, And Never the Twain Shall Meet: The Best Interests of Children 
and the Adversary System, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 79, 136–38 (1997). 
 352. Weinstein, supra note 351, at 90.   
 353. Seymore, International Adoption, supra note 33, at 173.  
 354. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6  (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). 
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III.  THE CONTOURS OF ETHICAL LAWYERING IN ADOPTION 
A.  Child-Centered Versus Client-Centered Lawyering 
Adoption is presented as a child-centered process of finding fam-
ilies for children in need of them, operating in the best interests of 
children.355 But the rules of legal ethics require attorneys to ap-
proach it as a client-centered process, where the attorney seeks the 
ends of the client without consideration of the interests of the child 
or any other party.356 A case may be couched in terms of the best 
interests of the child, but “[b]ecause the adversary process limits 
parties to fighting for their own interests, arguments made about 
the best interests of the child can be seen as mere manipulations 
to benefit the positions of the parties making them.”357 And in 
adoption, there are many missing parties—the birth father is often 
absent358 and the child, the subject of the adoption, is rarely given 
a voice or protection of counsel.359 The birth mother may be off 
stage by the time the case makes it to court, having waived all no-
tice of continuing proceedings by relinquishing her parental 
rights.360 Extended family is generally ignored altogether.361 Be-
cause adoption is usually viewed as a positive development for 
all—a birth parent unable or unwilling to parent, an adoptive fam-
ily eager to welcome a much-wanted child, and a needy child des-
perate for family—sometimes little care is taken to determine if 
 
 355. See sources cited supra note 66 (explaining the widespread use of the best interest 
of the child standard).  
 356. Wasserstrom, supra note 64, at 5–6. Contra Katherine R. Kruse, Engaged Client-
Centered Representation and the Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relationship, 39 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 577, 586–91 (2011) (arguing that the client-centered approach should in-
clude the consequences client decisions may have on others whose well being is valued by 
the client). 
 357. Weinstein, supra note 351, at 90. 
 358. Seymore, Grasping Fatherhood, supra note 30, at 826 (citing Caban v. Mohammed, 
441 U.S. 380, 392 (1979)).  
 359. Maryland is one of the few states that require the child be represented by counsel. 
See MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 5-338(a)(3). 
 360. See, e.g., In re Hagedorn, 725 N.E.2d 397, 399 (Ind. 2000) (per curiam) (sanctioning 
attorney in adoption case where birth mother consented to adoption, but attorney failed to 
file the proper paperwork to finalize the adoption).  
 361. Gilbert A. Holmes, The Extended Family System in the Black Community: A Child-
Centered Model for Adoption Policy, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1649, 1652 (1995). The Supreme Court 
has recognized some limited rights in extended families. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 
U.S. 57 (2000) (acknowledging states can grant grandparents’ statutory visitation rights but 
reversing trial court visitation order for unconstitutionally infringing on parental rights). 
But even that very limited right does not extend to biological families when the birth par-
ents’ rights are terminated. 
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the child is really needy or if the birth parent is really unable to 
parent.362 Adoption may not, in a particular case, be a win-win-win.  
With the current client-centered approach to legal ethics, the 
lawyer’s role as counselor is particularly important in considering 
the best interests of the nonclient child. The Model Rules conduct 
make clear that “a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other 
considerations such as moral, economic, social and political factors 
that may be relevant to the client’s situation.”363 The Model Rules 
recognize that advice that is narrowly legal may well be inade-
quate; “practical considerations, such as . . . effects on other peo-
ple,” may predominate.364 A lawyer may need to offer even un-
wanted advice, and “may initiate advice to a client when doing so 
appears to be in the client’s interest.”365 An understanding of the 
psychosocial aspects of adoption illustrates certain realities that 
lawyers must consider in adoption cases.366 
Professor Katherine Kruse has argued that client-centered law-
yering should not focus on the client’s legal interests, narrowly un-
derstood, but should consider all of the client’s interests:  
As a result of their legal professional training, lawyers have a ten-
dency to over-value their clients’ legal rights and interests relative to 
the weight that their clients might assign to the protection of those 
rights and interests when the clients compare[] them to the other 
things that the clients value. If a lawyer is not careful, a client’s hu-
man problem can disappear, and the client can appear instead as a 
bundle of legal rights and interests walking around in a human body. 
The client’s important non-legal interests—the client’s relationships 
 
 362. Prescott & Debele, supra note 18, at 152–53 (“It is also too easy for attorneys to 
become caught up in the view that family formation work always exemplifies goodness and 
morality, possibly causing them to disregard the interests of the other parent as the lawyer 
marches toward the goal of creating a new and legally recognized parent/child relation-
ship.”).  
 363. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 2.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019); see Kim Diana Con-
nolly, Elucidating the Elephant: Interdisciplinary Law School Classes, 11 WASH. U. J.L. & 
POL’Y 11, 13 (2003) (arguing that “in order to understand legal problems, lawyers often need 
to examine them from the perspective of multiple disciplines”); Rhode, supra note 48, at 
1318.  
 364. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 2.1 cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). 
 365. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 2.1 cmt. 5 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). 
 366. For review of psychosocial literature relevant to adoption, see Seymore, Interna-
tional Adoption, supra note 33, at 166–67 (examining psychosocial literature regarding 
openness in adoption); Seymore, Grasping Fatherhood, supra note 30, at 847–50 (reviewing 
psychosocial literature regarding birth fathers), and Seymore, Sixteen & Pregnant, supra 
note 29, at 138, 144–45 (discussing psychosocial literature regarding birth mothers , similar 
literature regarding adoptees). 
. 
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with others, reputation and standing in the community, values, and 
commitments that the client wants to honor—can fade into the back-
ground as the client’s legal rights and interests come more sharply 
into focus.367 
She argues that lawyers have “a responsibility to shape legal rep-
resentation around a more robust and holistic understanding of cli-
ent objectives,” obviating the singular focus that disregards the in-
terests of others.368 Stephen Ellmann posits that Carol Gilligan’s 
“ethic of care,” which “focuses not on abstract rights and duties, 
but rather on the connections between people,” can inform lawyers 
of their ethical obligations.369 Ellmann concedes that a lawyer owes 
a greater duty of care to her client than to others, and “need not 
care equally for all involved in any given situation.”370 But he ar-
gues that a lawyer need not follow a client’s directions when they 
are inconsistent with the ethic of care, as in when there are con-
cerns for third parties.371 In accord with Kruse, Ellmann believes 
that the lawyer should, instead, seek to “try to reshape her client’s 
decision making rather than permit him to make a putatively in-
dependent, but uncaring, choice.”372 
 
 367. Kruse, supra note 356, at 584. 
 368. Id. at 586. 
 369. Stephen Ellmann, The Ethic of Care as an Ethic for Lawyers, 81 GEO. L.J. 2665, 
2665 (1993) (citing CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND 
WOMEN’S DEVELOPMENT (1982)). In another article, I described Gilligan’s work as follows: 
Gilligan discovered that psychological theory about the moral development of 
humans was developed from tests and observations of boys and men. When she 
began to explore how girls and women resolved moral dilemmas she discovered 
“a different voice,” one heretofore ignored in psychological literature. Gilligan 
reported that boys resolved conflicts by employing a “hierarchical ladder of val-
ues,” while girls used a very different reasoning process, an “ethic of care,” fo-
cused on preserving relationships. Gilligan argues that girls and women see “a 
world comprised of relationships rather than of people standing alone, a world 
that coheres through human connection rather than through systems of rules.’ 
The relevance of this psychological work to law is obvious. Feminist legal schol-
ars have used Gilligan’s work to argue that law is an essentially male dis-
course, with the woman’s voice marginalized. Law operates within Gilligan’s 
male-identified “hierarchy of rights” instead of the female identified “ethic of 
care.” 
Malinda L. Seymore, Isn’t It a Crime: Feminist Perspectives on Spousal Immunity and 
Spousal Violence, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1032, 1068 (1996) (footnotes omitted) (first quoting 
Gary Minda, Jurisprudential Movements of the 1980s, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 599, 626–29 (1989); 
and then quoting CAROL J. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE 24–63 (1982)). 
 370. Ellmann, supra note 369, at 2681–82. 
 371. See id. at 2708–09. 
 372. Id. at 2709. 
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But is an ethic-of-care approach to lawyering consistent with ex-
isting codes of ethics? Ellmann believes so, grounding his argu-
ment in the rules of professional responsibility governing the role 
of lawyers as advisors and counselors.373 But he cautions that the 
existing rules provide “no overt authorization or encouragement of 
intervention into client decisions to the degree the ethic of care 
would sanction.”374 The experience of collaborative lawyering also 
suggests that an ethic of care is consistent with the Model Rules 
for lawyers. Collaborative lawyering, utilized in family dispute res-
olution—in particular in divorce cases—offers the promise of a 
more cooperative and less contentious approach.375 “[Collaborative 
lawyering] encourages spouses to honor the positive connections 
between them so that they can divorce respectfully and maintain 
good relationships with children and other relatives.”376 Bar au-
thorities have found that collaborative lawyering is consistent with 
rules of professional ethics.377 While collaborative lawyering is uti-
lized frequently in divorce,378 other issues of family law, including 
adoption, seem ideal for a collaborative lawyering approach that 
centers the interest of the child.  
B.  Ensuring a Successful Adoption 
Ethical adoption lawyering requires adherence to all of the rules 
of professional responsibility, of course. Not only is this adherence 
 
 373. Id.  
 374. Id. at 2709–10.  
 375. See generally John Lande, Possibilities for Collaborative Law: Ethics and Practice 
of Lawyer Disqualification and Process Control in a New Model of Lawyering, 64 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 1315 (2003) (assessing the state of collaborative law negotiation and how it interacts 
with legal ethical issues); Pauline H. Tesler, Collaborative Law: A New Paradigm for Di-
vorce Lawyers, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 967 (1999) (discussing the benefits offered by a 
collaborative law approach to the traditionally adversarial field of family law).  
 376. Lande, supra note 375, at 1318. 
 377. See, e.g., UNIF. COLLABORATIVE LAW RULES & UNIF. COLLABORATIVE LAW ACT Pref-
atory Note (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010), reprinted in 48 FAM. L.Q. 55, 79-80 (2014) (“Numer-
ous bar association ethics committees have concluded collaborative law is generally con-
sistent with the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and the obligations of lawyers to 
clients.”); Ted Schneyer, The Organized Bar and the Collaborative Law Movement: A Study 
in Professional Change, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 289, 289, 305–10 (2008) (“The state legislatures 
and courts that have taken notice of [collaborative law] to date are uniformly encouraging 
its use in divorce cases and other family disputes.”). Only the Colorado Bar has opined that 
collaborative law may violate ethics rules. Colo. Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 115 
(2007). However, that position was rejected by the American Bar Association. ABA Comm. 
on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 04-447 (2007). 
 378. UNIF. COLLABORATIVE LAW RULES & UNIF. COLLABORATIVE LAW ACT, supra note 
377, at 69–70. 
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necessary to prevent disciplinary measures by the bar licensing au-
thorities, it is also important in achieving a legally enforceable 
adoption that can withstand legal challenges. Finally, it is im-
portant in effectuating the promise of adoption, that it be in the 
best interest of the child.  
When representing prospective adoptive parents, the lawyer’s 
first concern may well be that the adoption proceeds to final judg-
ment. Some believe the best way to achieve that goal is to push the 
birth mother to sign relinquishment paperwork as quickly as the 
law allows and to ignore the birth father in the hopes that he will 
not assert any rights he may have. This approach, however, is 
risky. This course of conduct sets up potential challenges to the 
adoption.379 Even if the challenges fail, they increase the costs of 
adoption, result in delays in finalization, and cause emotional 
trauma to all parties involved. Rather, it is in the best interest of 
the prospective adoptive parents to ensure that both prospective 
birth parents are making fully informed and voluntary decisions. 
Fully informed decisions can be made only after consultation with 
independent counsel, counsel who is not representing the adoptive 
parents or the adoption agency.380 It is only slightly better when 
the independent counsel is paid by the adoptive parents; I have 
proposed previously that courts should appoint and pay for counsel 
for minor birth parents in the same manner in which they appoint 
counsel for parents in cases involving the involuntary termination 
of parental rights.381 In advising the birth mother, ensuring the fi-
nality of the adoption requires careful advice to affirm that her 
consent is voluntary. Advising the mother of services available to 
help her parent—eligibility for state and federal welfare assistance 
for her and the child, available state services to determine pater-
nity and enforce child support orders, for instance—will help her 
consider whether adoption placement is what she wants rather 
than an act of desperation.382 Many states require similar infor-
mation about resources available to help parents be informed be-
fore an abortion decision, so it would not be onerous to require it 
before an adoption placement decision.383  
 
 379. See discussion supra notes 158–65, 234–42 and accompanying text.  
 380. See discussion supra notes 216–76 and accompanying text.  
 381. Seymore, Sixteen & Pregnant, supra note 29, at 154–56.  
 382. Id. at 154–55. 
 383. See id. at 155; Counseling and Waiting Periods for Abortion, GUTTMACHER INST., 
https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/counseling-and-waiting-periods-abortion 
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Some might argue that this proposal is asking lawyers to be so-
cial workers, and it is true that there may be a fine line between 
“where lawyering ends and social work begins.”384 Yet, it is well-
understood in child welfare cases that lawyers need to understand 
social work practice and vice versa.385 If adoption law is truly de-
signed to focus on the best interest of the child, then that interdis-
ciplinary approach should extend to adoptions as well. A lawyer 
handling adoptions needs to be aware of the psycho-social realities 
of adoption and adoption relationships so that she can effectively 
counsel the client beyond legal technicalities. A lawyer may con-
sider collaborating with a social worker if he feels limited in serv-
ing this important function. 
Employing the “passive strategy” of the In re Krigel case with 
the birth father, ignoring him or shutting him out in the hopes that 
he will not do what is necessary to assert parental rights, is also 
risking a later challenge to the adoption from the birth father.386 
Going beyond passive to actively thwarting the birth father may 
not only risk the finality of the adoption, but it may lead to legal 
liability for tortious interference with parental rights as well as bar 
discipline as in In re Krigel.387 The concern seems to be that if the 
attorney reaches out to the birth father, he may assert his rights, 
so it is better to ignore him and hope that he does not resurface at 
a critical time. But available research suggests that birth fathers 
who are involved in the adoption placement decision are more 
likely to be cooperative than otherwise.388 Several states have sim-
plified procedures that allow a disinterested birth father to easily 
bow out of the case.389 
 
[https://perma.cc/T9JX-EMST]. 
 384. See Paula Galowitz, Collaboration Between Lawyers and Social Workers: Re-exam-
ining the Nature and Potential of the Relationship, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2123, 2125 (1999). 
 385. Kathleen Coulborn Faller & Frank E. Vandervort, Interdisciplinary Clinical Teach-
ing of Child Welfare Practice to Law and Social Work Students: When World Views Collide, 
41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 121, 121–22 (2007). 
 386. See discussion supra notes 162–77 and accompanying text.  
 387. See supra note 177 and accompanying text. 
 388. Deykin et al., supra note 179, at 243; see also Brandt, supra note 70, at 223–24. 
(“Moreover, the secrecy with which these cases move forward may, in itself, result in polar-
ization and mistrust leading to litigation that might not otherwise take place.”). 
 389. Joan Heifetz Hollinger & William M. Schur, Releases, Consents, Relinquishments, 
Surrenders, Entrustment Agreements, Disclaimers, and Waivers § 4.11, in 1 ADOPTION LAW 
AND PRACTICE (Joan Heifetz Hollinger ed., 2019) (“In some jurisdictions, alleged biological 
fathers and other persons who have or may claim a legal interest in a child are permitted to 
execute special documents through which they disclaim or quitclaim whatever legal rights 
they might otherwise have with respect to a child.”); see, e.g., TEX. FAMILY CODE § 161.106 
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The perceived downside of actually securing valid consent from 
the prospective birth parents is that they may choose to parent ra-
ther than relinquish their parental rights. Though that may not be 
the end desired by the prospective adoptive parents, it is the end 
to be desired in adoption. Adoption is for children who do not al-
ready have parents. If a child has a willing and able parent, then 
adoption is not in the child’s best interest.390 After all, “[a]doption 
is about finding families for children, not about finding children for 
families.”391  
Psychosocial research also suggests that what is in the best in-
terests of a child in a completed adoption is continuing relation-
ships between the adopted child and birth family.392 Ethical law-
yering requires an attorney to advise parties to the adoption of the 
long-term consequences of adoption and of the benefits of preserv-
ing on-going relationships. An ethical adoption attorney advises 
clients to avoid the winner-take-all litigation strategy that shuts 
out the interests of others, especially the interests of the child. 
When I read a case like Lemley v. Barr393 or In re Krigel,394 I wonder 
how the prospective adoptive parents would explain their conduct 
to their adopted children as they reach adulthood: “Though your 
birth parent wanted to parent you, were quite capable of doing so, 
and fought at every turn to do so, I asked the lawyer to employ 
every trick and stratagem available to cut them out of your life. I 
won! Aren’t you lucky to be my child?!” Adopted children grow up 
to be adopted adults, and their views of their adoptions may not be 
quite as rose-colored as their adoptive parents believe. 
C.  Solutions from Behavioral Ethics 
“The problems that descriptive work on unintentional unethical 
behavior identified have been difficult to address, given that people 
are unaware that their biases underlie them.”395 The unconscious 
 
(“A man may sign an affidavit disclaiming any interest in a child and waiving notice or the 
service of citation in any suit filed or to be filed affecting the parent-child relationship with 
respect to the child.”). 
 390. The court in In re Krigel recognized that it was in the child’s best interest to remain 
with his natural father, rather than to be placed for adoption. 480 S.W.3d 294, 298, 300 (Mo. 
2016) (en banc). 
 391. JOYCE MAGUIRE PAVAO, THE FAMILY OF ADOPTION 24 (2005). 
 392. For a review of relevant literature, see sources cited supra note 366. 
 393. 343 S.E.2d 101 (W. Va. 1986). 
 394. 480 S.W.3d 294. 
 395. Sezer et al., supra note 46, at 78.  
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nature of most unethical decision making makes the usual pre-
scription, educating attorneys about ethical rules and punishing 
them for breaking them, alone insufficient.396 Indeed, there is some 
evidence that a system like the current attorney-sanction regime, 
with low rates of sanction, actually increases unethical behavior 
rather than improving behavior.397 Instead, lawyers need to learn 
about behavioral psychology to help them understand and avoid 
ethical blind spots.398 Tigran Eldred describes incorporating les-
sons from behavioral legal ethics in the professional responsibility 
courses he teaches399 and given that students in every law school 
must take that class, it provides a natural home for lessons about 
the dangers of ethical blind spots.  
Sezer, Gino, and Bazerman suggest that actors can avoid ethical 
blind spots by “moving from System 1 to System 2 processing.”400 
System 1 processing  is “fast, automatic, effortless, and emotional,” 
and results in processing that is far more biased than System 2 
processing, which is “slow, deliberate, effortful, and reason 
based.”401 Framing decisions so that decision makers can take more 
time and enable the shift from System 1 to System 2 processes,402 
as lack of time is a cognitive stressor that can result in unethical 
decisions.403 Joint decision making can also result in more deliber-
ative, less automatic, decision making.404 This may be difficult for 
adoption lawyers, who often engage in solo practice, but that 
simply means that they must plan ahead to develop trusted net-
works of others with whom they can consult.405 
When decision makers are prompted to look for problems with a 
decision they have made, they are more likely to engage in System 
2 processing.406 Focusing on counterfactuals before decisions are 
 
 396. Robbennolt & Sternlight, supra note 14, at 1156. 
 397. Sezer et al., supra note 46, at 80 (“[W]eak sanctioning systems—those with both a 
small probability of detecting unethical behavior and small punishments—actually increase 
unethical behavior relative to having no sanctioning system.”). 
 398. See Robbennolt & Sternlight, supra note 14, at 1157. 
 399. See generally Eldred, supra note 15.  
 400. Sezer et al., supra note 46, at 78. 
 401. Id.; Bazerman & Sezer, supra note 44, at 103.  
 402. Sezer et al., supra note 46, at 78; see also Robbennolt & Sternlight, supra note 14, 
at 1162.  
 403. Robbennolt & Sternlight, supra note 14, at 1162. 
 404. See Sezer et al., supra note 46, at 78–79.  
 405. Robbennolt & Sternlight, supra 14, at 1162.  
 406. Bazerman & Sezer, supra note 44, at 103 (noting that “we need research to discover 
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finalized, deliberately taking positions opposite to one’s first in-
stincts, and actively considering an outsider’s perspective can 
move a decision maker toward System 2 processes.407 Adoption 
lawyers should consider that different members of the adoption 
triad may have different views of adoption, both now and in the 
future. Consider how a particular action during the adoption pro-
cess might appear later to an adoptee as an adult, for example. It 
may be that the lawyer’s client is the one pushing for unethical 
treatment of another party; as Deborah Rhode notes, “[t]he stress, 
acrimony, and financial pressures that can accompany legal dis-
putes often compromise clients’ ability to perceive their own long-
term interests or the ethical implications of self-serving behav-
ior.”408 The lawyer’s role, then, is to “provide a useful reality check 
for individuals whose judgment is skewed by self-interest or cogni-
tive biases.”409  
Since much of bounded ethicality is driven by unconscious self-
interest, one way to alleviate the effect of self-interest may be “to 
change the ways that . . . lawyers calculate self-interest.”410 Re-
framing the outcome goal also allows the lawyer to protect against 
potential unethical conduct by the client who may seek to push be-
yond ethical bounds to ensure that they successfully gain the child. 
A lawyer can cast ethical advice to respect the interests of all of the 
triad in more pragmatic terms:  
Conduct that attorneys find ethically objectionable can be more diplo-
matically packaged as unduly risky, as something that will not play 
well with jurors, government regulators, the media or the general pub-
lic. By the same token, the moral high road can also be portrayed as 
desirable for prudential reasons. In the long term, attorneys can often 
argue, “ethics pays.”411 
In an adoption case, the lawyer representing prospective adop-
tive parents should see as the best outcome one that ensures that 
the adoption will be in the best interests of the child and will sur-
vive all potential legal challenges. Thus, rather than rushing the 
birth mother to a decision or erecting barriers to the birth father’s 
 
the conditions that prompt System 2 thinking so that individuals will notice unethical be-
havior more often”).  
 407. Tigran W. Eldred, Prescriptions for Ethical Blindness: Improving Advocacy for In-
digent Defendants in Criminal Cases, 65 RUTGERS L. REV. 333, 389–90 (2013). 
 408. Rhode, supra note 48, at 1320. 
 409. Id. 
 410. See Eldred, supra note 407, at 388.  
 411. Rhode, supra note 48, at 1318–19.  
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involvement, the lawyer’s self-interest would be to take all steps 
necessary to ensure that the interests of these parents are re-
spected. 
Social scientists also argue for institutional “fixes” to ethical 
blind spots by designing institutions and changing the design of 
existing institutions to promote ethical behavior.412 One institu-
tional fix, the institution of ethics codes, has been seen as success-
ful by some social scientists, as ethics codes can assert ethical val-
ues that decision makers can aspire to.413 But ethical codes alone 
are not enough to change behavior, as other incentives may create 
pressures to behave unethically.414 Perhaps the best-known propo-
nents of “nudging” actors toward better behavior through nearly 
invisible design changes are Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler.415 
Nancy Rapoport has suggested that lawyers can be nudged toward 
better behavior by changing incentive structures and imposing de-
fault rules.416 The adoption arena, especially the almost wholly un-
regulated area of private adoption, has default rules and incentive 
structures that allow faulty and unethical decision makers to flour-
ish.417 
Policymakers could certainly consider changes to the substan-
tive law of adoption to rework some default rules. In the area of 
conflict of interest, for example, rather than relying on attorneys 
to correctly appraise whether they can appropriately represent 
both prospective birth parents and adoptive parents, dual repre-
sentation should be banned altogether, as in New York.418 Legisla-
tures should require independent legal counsel for prospective 
birth parents and fund court-appointed attorneys for them, avoid-
 
 412. Sezer et al., supra note 46, at 79–80. 
 413. Id. at 79. 
 414. Id. 
 415. See generally RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING 
DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (Penguin Books rev. ed., 2009) (ex-
pounding a theory of motivating human behavior through “nudges” or “any aspect of the 
choice architecture that alters people’s behavior in a predictable way without forbidding any 
options”). 
 416. Nancy B. Rapoport, “Nudging” Better Lawyer Behavior: Using Default Rules and 
Incentives to Change Behavior in Law Firms, 4 SAINT MARY’S J. LEGAL MALPRACTICE & 
ETHICS 42, 68 (2014). 
 417. See Susan A. Munson, Comment, Independent Adoption: In Whose Best Interest?, 26 
SETON HALL L. REV. 803, 809, 814–15, 830 (1996) (decrying the largely unregulated nature 
of private adoption). But see Pustilnik, supra note 24, at 263–64, 266 (arguing that the un-
regulated nature of private adoption is a positive thing). 
 418. See discussion supra notes 217–34.  
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ing the potential for divided loyalties when the birth parent’s at-
torney is paid for by the adoptive parents.419 Further protection for 
fathers’ rights in adoption would avoid the “passive strategy” de-
signed to burden his assertion of rights.420 These are rather large 
nudges, of course. Absent these fixes, adoption lawyers must create 
their own incentives to disconnect themselves from the uncon-
scious biases that lead to bad decisions. Anticipating and actively 
guarding against ethical blind spots, incentivized with the realiza-
tion that ethical adoption is in the best interests of all of the adop-
tion triad, is a starting place. 
CONCLUSION 
The best interests of children are to be raised by their biological 
parents. If that is not possible, the best interests of children are a 
secure and permanent adoptive placement that respects their con-
nection to their first families. Ethical lawyering in adoption en-
sures this outcome. But that ethical lawyering must go beyond me-
chanical adherence to the Model Rules. Ethical lawyering in 
adoption centers the interests of the child, while keeping in mind 
the interests of all members of the adoption triad. Adoption law-
yers need to be competent in both adoption law and the psychoso-
cial aspects of adoption. Best practices for ensuring a successful 
and legally unchallengeable adoption require cooperation and col-
laboration between parties, all of whom are represented by inde-
pendent legal counsel. To guard against personal conflicts, lawyers 
need to examine their attitudes toward adoption and not allow the 
rainbows-and-unicorns fantasies of family formation to obfuscate 
the fact that all adoptions begin with loss—the child loses a first 
family, the birth family loses a child, the adoptive family often 
loses their image of a biological child. While adoptive families also 
gain a child—and the child gains a family—lawyering with loss in 
mind encourages an adoption attorney to consider the interests of 
all parties to minimize that loss. Believing that adoption work is 
purely good can lead to ethical blind spots, to an ends-justify-
means rationalization that can risk both the lawyer’s license and 
the legality of the adoption itself. In a previous article, I argued 
that “ethical adoption practices should be as simple as doing the 
 
 419. See discussion supra note 379 and accompanying text.  
 420. See discussion supra notes 149–55 and accompanying text. 
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right thing because it is right.”421 If further incentive is needed, 
lawyers must be aware that unethical adoption practices may risk 
civil damages for legal malpractice, risk sanction by the state bar, 
risk a court invalidating an adoption, and risk the best interests of 
the child. 
 
 421. Seymore, Adopting Civil Damages, supra note 8, at 961.  
